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ESSAY
ANTI-SANCTUARY AND IMMIGRATION LOCALISM
Pratheepan Gulasekaram,* Rick Su ** & Rose Cuison Villazor***
A new front in the war against sanctuary cities has emerged. Until
recently, the ﬁght against sanctuary cities has largely focused on the
federal government’s eforts to defund states like California and cities
like Chicago and New York for resisting federal immigration enforcement.
Thus far, localities have mainly prevailed against this federal antisanctuary campaign, relying on federalism protections aforded by the
Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering and anticoercion doctrines.
Recently, however, the battle lines have shifted with the proliferation of
state-level laws that similarly seek to punish sanctuary cities. States
across the country are directly mandating local participation, and
courts thus far have upheld those state policies. These laws, like Texas’s
S.B. 4, prohibit local sanctuary policies and impose severe punishments
on the cities and ofcials that support them. This new state-versus-local
terrain has doctrinal, political, and normative implications for the
future of local government resistance to immigration enforcement. These
implications have thus far been undertheorized in immigration-law
scholarship. This Essay seeks to change that.
This Essay is the first to focus on this emerging wave of state antisanctuary laws. In so doing, it makes three contributions. First,
descriptively, the Essay documents the upsurge of anti-sanctuary laws
that have appeared across the United States and explains how they
difer from prior anti-sanctuary laws. Second, doctrinally, it argues that
the passage of these laws nudges sanctuary cities to uncharted legal
territory in immigration law—localism. Under conventional localism
principles, state anti-sanctuary laws are in a position to more fully
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** Professor of Law, University at Bufalo Law School.
*** Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.
The authors wish to thank Jamie Abrams, Andrew Ayers, Linda Bosniak, Richard
Boswell, Ray Brescia, Anupam Chander, Nestor Davidson, Chris Elmendorf, Amanda Frost,
Alan Hyde, Irene Joe, Kevin Johnson, Stephen Lee, Daniel Morales, Kathleen Morris, Huyen
Pham, Michael Pollack, Leticia Saucedo, Ragini Shah, Darien Shanske, Peter Spiro,
Kenneth Stahl, and Allison Brownell Tirres, as well as participants in faculty workshops
and paper presentation series at Immigration Law Teachers Conference 2018, Fordham
University School of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law, U.C. Davis Law
School, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law, Rutgers Law School, Santa Clara
University School of Law, and University of Bufalo School of Law where we presented
earlier versions of this Essay. We are grateful to Gin Smith and William Klein for their
excellent research assistance. Lastly, we thank the editors of the Columbia Law Review for
outstanding editorial assistance.

837

838

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:837

quash local sanctuary policies and efectively conscript local ofcials
into federal immigration enforcement. However, the draconian structure
of state anti-sanctuary laws provides a unique context in which to
advance what we call “immigration localism” claims and protect three
distinct interests that concern local governments: structural integrity,
accountability, and local democracy. Third, normatively, this Essay
contends that immigration localism provides a more accurate descriptive
and theoretical account of how current immigration enforcement operates
and promotes community engagement with immigration enforcement.
Specifically, the reorientation toward localism accounts for the powerful
role that cities play in immigration enforcement and decenters the federal
government’s dominant role in that enforcement. To be sure, this Essay
recognizes that casting a theoretical gaze toward local discretion may end
up emboldening the most exclusionary impulses of localities and
supporting local anti-sanctuary policies. In the long run, however, local
discretion in immigration enforcement is likely to better serve the interests
of noncitizens and citizens alike.
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I. THE DIVERGENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE ANTI-SANCTUARY .............. 844
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INTRODUCTION
Although she was elected on the same day as Donald Trump, Travis
County Sherif Sally Hernandez had a decidedly diferent take on the
appropriate role of local law enforcement in matters of immigration.
Sherif Hernandez won county ofce in Texas promising to reduce her
county’s cooperation with immigration enforcement authorities, stating
that “[o]ur community is safer when people can report crimes without
fear of deportation.”1 In staking that position, Hernandez added Travis
County to the number of sanctuary jurisdictions singled out by President
Trump and then-Attorney General Jef Sessions.2 The President and his
Attorney General, along with other key members of their political party,
vowed to punish those jurisdictions, pressuring them with loss of funds
and other sanctions.3 Indeed, soon after Hernandez took ofce, Greg
Abbott, the Republican governor of Texas, threatened to pull state
funding from Travis County unless the Sherif changed her stance on
assisting federal immigration agents.4 A few months later, Governor Abbot
enthusiastically signed Texas S.B. 4, the state’s anti-sanctuary law.5 The
law limits endorsement of sanctuary policies, cuts down on the discretion
of local agencies to disentangle themselves from federal enforcement,
and creates civil and criminal liability for ofcials who maintain certain
types of noncooperation policies on aiding federal immigration
enforcement.6
Texas is not the only state to have passed such a law. Since 2015, six
other states—Alabama,7 Indiana,8 Iowa,9 Mississippi,10 North Carolina,11
1. Press Release, Travis Cty. Sherif’s Ofce, Statement from Sherif Sally Hernandez
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.tcsherif.org/about/press-releases/2017/411-statement-fromsherif-sally-hernandez [https://perma.cc/9C23-5V9H].
2. Julián Aguilar, Travis County Sherif Announces New “Sanctuary” Policy, Tex.
Trib. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/20/travis-county-sherifannounces-new-sanctuary-poli/ [https://perma.cc/Z48X-L765].
3. Martin Kaste, Trump Threatens ‘Sanctuary’ Cities with Loss of Federal Funds,
NPR (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/26/511899896/
trumps-threatens-sanctuary-cities-with-loss-of-federal-funds [https://perma.cc/5T85-5CND];
Sedria Renee, Texas Gov. Abbot Halts Travis County Funding over Sanctuary Policy, NBC News
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/texas-gov-abbot-halts-travis-countyfunding-over-sanctuary-policy-n716201 [https://perma.cc/5PGT-RC86].
4. Renee, supra note 3.
5. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)
(2017)).
6. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)–(3).
7. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (2018).
8. See Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2 (2018).
9. See S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed at Iowa
Code § 825.1).
10. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-119 (2018).
11. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-145.5, 160A-205.2 (2018). A more expansive antisanctuary measure, S.B. 145, passed the North Carolina Senate in 2017 but failed in the
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and Tennessee12—have passed similar ones. And at least seventeen states
have introduced or passed like-minded bills.13 This turn toward state antisanctuary legislation marks a momentous shift in the debate over
sanctuary cities, for they represent the most signiﬁcant threat yet to
conscript local ofcials and agencies into the federal immigration
enforcement regime.
Consider Texas’s S.B. 4. Referred to as a “show me your papers”
law,14 S.B. 4 was challenged by the City of El Cenizo, which argued that
the law—which prohibits local governments from adopting sanctuary
policies—is preempted by federal immigration law and is unconstitutionally vague.15 Although the district court in City of El Cenizo v. Texas
agreed with the city’s preemption arguments and issued a preliminary
injunction,16 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
much of the lower court’s decision, ruling that federal immigration laws
do not preempt a state’s authority to compel its localities to comply with
the federal government.17 Instead, the court noted that S.B. 4 merely
does on a state level what local governments within the state have done—
regulate whether to cooperate with the federal government.18 The Fifth
Circuit’s decision simultaneously demonstrates the court’s recognition of
local decisionmaking in immigration law and the power of the state to
compel local governments to comply with federal immigration authorities.
Despite this significant swing toward state preemption, little attention
has been paid thus far to this development in immigration law scholarship,19
House. See S.B. 145, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). The bill number was later
reused for an entirely diferent issue. See Senate Bill 145/SL 2018-74, N.C. Gen. Assembly,
https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/SB%20145 [https://perma.cc/W43C-D75Z] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2019).
12. See H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018).
13. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 7282.5 (2018); 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/5 (West
2019); S.B. 18-220, 71st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018); H.B. 9, 2018 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018); H.B. 105, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018); H.B. 205,
30th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2017); S.B. 14, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017);
H.B. 501, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017); H.P. 272, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2017); H.B. 4105, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017); H.B. 611, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Mont. 2017); S.O. 3698, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); H.B. 179, 132d Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); S.B. 10, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017); H.B.
1985, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); S.B. 275, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2017);
S.B. 1378, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016).
14. See Manny Fernandez, Texas Banned ‘Sanctuary Cities.’ Some Police Departments
Didn’t Get the Memo., N.Y. Times (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/15/us/texas-sanctuary-sb4-immigration.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
15. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 760–75 (W.D. Tex. 2017), af’d
in part and vacated in part, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018).
16. See id. at 812–13.
17. See City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 180.
18. See id. at 178 (stating that “[i]n its operation, S.B. 4 is similar to one of the city
[sanctuary] ordinances some plaintif[] [cities] have themselves adopted”).
19. To be sure, immigration law scholars have analyzed the roles that state and local
governments doctrinally and normatively play in the regulation and enforcement of
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and only recently has the local-government literature begun to address the
issue.20 Instead, legal scholarship has been primarily consumed with the
constitutionality of so-called “sanctuary cities.”21 These jurisdictions, all of
which maintain policies that limit local cooperation and communication
with federal immigration authorities to difering degrees,22 became the
centerpiece of then-candidate Donald Trump’s campaign23 and have
remained a central obsession of President Trump.24 Accordingly, much
popular and scholarly energy has been devoted to the legality of federal
crackdowns on these noncooperating jurisdictions and agencies.25

immigration law. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority
Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution,
31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 965, 970–71, 975–76 (2004); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Signiﬁcance
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 567, 581–90 (2008); Rick Su, A
Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulation, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1619 (2008)
[hereinafter Su, Localist]. To date, however, this Essay is the only to examine state antisanctuary laws and their implications for immigration law.
20. See, e.g., Richard Brifault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 Stan. L.
Rev. 1995, 2005 (2018) [hereinafter Brifault, New Preemption]; Erin Adele Scharf,
Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?, 106 Geo. L.J. 1469,
1506–07 (2018). Our examination of state anti-sanctuary laws difers from these articles in
signiﬁcant ways in that we consider, among other things, how state anti-sanctuary laws are
impacting the legal arguments that cities could bring against states and whether, as a
normative matter, the trend toward localism in immigration law should itself be supported.
21. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C.
L. Rev. 1703, 1741–43 (2018) (discussing the “constitutional safeguards for administrative
arrest warrants” in the immigration context); David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583, 645 (2017) (noting
that “the anti-commandeering principle and related state sovereignty rationales play
leading roles in the scholarship defending subfederal sanctuary policies”).
22. See Lasch et. al., supra note 21, at 1705.
23. Donald Trump, Presidential Campaign Speech at Rally in Phoenix, Arizona (Aug.
31, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-trump-immigration-speechtranscript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/599N-JQ2D].
24. In 2018, the Department of Justice ﬁled a lawsuit against the state of California
contending that its status as a sanctuary state violates congressional mandates. See
Complaint at 2, United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018)
(No. 18-254), 2018 WL 1181625 [hereinafter California Complaint].
25. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Federalism Friction in the First Year of the Trump
Presidency, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 401, 402–15 (2018) (assessing the federalism
implications of the federal government’s targeting of sanctuary jurisdictions and
subsequent lower court decisions); Christine Kwon & Marissa Roy, Local Action, National
Impact: Standing Up for Sanctuary Cities, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 715, 715–17 (2018),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/KwonRoy_mtozyv98.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG4-49HR]
(advocating for dissenting cities against the federal government’s crackdown on sanctuary
jurisdictions, speciﬁcally San Francisco, California). Two of the authors of this Essay have
recently written an article examining sanctuary cities, but as part of a broader network of
private and public actions. See Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary
Networks, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1209 (2018) [hereinafter Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary
Networks] (discussing potential partnerships between public and private entities to provide
sanctuary to undocumented immigrants).
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As it turns out, however, federal attempts to shut down sanctuary
cities have largely been inefective, as they have either lacked
congressional support or been rejected by federal and state courts.26 In
litigation, cities and counties have successfully defeated federal attempts
to commandeer and coerce their participation.27 By contrast, as the Fifth
Circuit’s decision to uphold Texas’s S.B. 4 indicates, cities might not fare
as well when challenging state anti-sanctuary laws. The proliferation of
state anti-sanctuary laws and bills that seek to prohibit and penalize local
dissent from immigration law suggests that, at minimum, more litigation
between cities and states is likely to ensue. More broadly, the upsurge in
these state laws points to the need to explore in depth the doctrinal,
normative, and theoretical implications of this new development for
immigration enforcement and the future of sanctuary cities.
This Essay is the ﬁrst to focus on this new wave of state anti-sanctuary
eforts and, in doing so, provides fresh legal avenues for advocates to
engage in challenging state preemption of local sanctuary laws. At the
outset, it argues that the passage of these laws nudges sanctuary cities
away from federalism principles and toward a new legal landscape—what
we term “immigration localism.”28 This legal framework, which focuses
on the relationship between states and localities,29 is uncharted legal
territory for immigration law in general and sanctuary cities in particular,
which have mostly relied on federalism’s anticommandeering and
anticoercion principles.30 Within the state–local dynamic, however, cities
have traditionally been considered creatures of the state31 and thus
viewed as having limited local powers and as being susceptible to state
preemption and commandeering.32

26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part I.
28. One of us began using the term “immigration localism” more than ten years ago,
and this Essay builds on some of the concepts argued then. See Su, Localist, supra note 19,
at 1683 (using the term “immigration localism” and stating that it is “too early to predict
what a localist approach to immigration will ofer,” but “whatever immigration localism is
or comes to be, it is certainly an approach worth exploring”).
29. See id. at 1628–29 (describing the localist framework as a “legal, political and
ideological structure that organizes the institution of local governments under the state
level”); see also Richard Brifault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1307–17 (1994) (discussing
the convergence of federalism and localism) [hereinafter Brifault, What About the
‘Ism’?]; Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Federalism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an
Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 960–64 (2007) (discussing the relationship
between federal and local governments through “cooperative localism”).
30. See infra section I.A.
31. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (referring to municipalities as
“creatures of the state” that have no standing against “the will of their creator”).
32. See Richard Brifault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1990) [hereinafter Brifault, Our Localism: Part I]; Brifault,
What About the ‘Ism’?, supra note 29, at 1309; Scharf, supra note 20, at 1507.
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However, as this Essay points out, closer examination of localism
demonstrates that state anti-sanctuary laws are not as ominous for the
future of sanctuary cities as conventional thinking might suggest.
Speciﬁcally, we contend that localism itself contains powerful doctrinal
and normative arguments grounded in local autonomy that sanctuary
cities could use to challenge state anti-sanctuary laws.33 These previously
unexplored localist arguments are significant for immigration law because
they challenge the conventional descriptive and doctrinal view that the
federal government dominates immigration regulation. Crucially, these
arguments, grounded in localist principles, suggest that cities can and
should have greater roles in immigration enforcement alongside federal
and state governments.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. First, Part I provides a descriptive
account of the rise in both federal and state anti-sanctuary laws, categorizing
the ways in which they have evolved from previous immigration enforcement laws and how those past eforts difer from federal and state antisanctuary eforts today.
Next, Part II examines the new immigration localism landscape in
which sanctuary cities must defend their policies. Despite the presumption
in favor of state preemption, this Part argues that localism ofers not only
a new legal avenue for cities and other localities to push back against
state anti-sanctuary laws but also a novel perspective for thinking about
local sanctuary policies and anti-sanctuary eforts more generally.
Lastly, Part III turns to the normative case for immigration localism.
Localism as an analytical lens allows for a better accounting of the way
that current immigration enforcement actually operates. This descriptive
reorientation in turn decenters the federal government’s role in setting
immigration enforcement policy. Additionally, it prompts an opportunity
to explore the powerful role that cities can and should play in immigration
regulation and enforcement. To be sure, this Part acknowledges that
immigration localism is not without legal and political peril for
immigration advocates.34 While recognizing some of these important

33. For discussion of the law of localism as grounds for local autonomy, see David J.
Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 Duke L.J. 377, 383 (2001) (arguing
that central lawmaking authority can promote local autonomy “by altering the kinds of
limits on local authority that are already, and necessarily, established by less visible
provisions of central law”); Brifault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 32, at 9–10
(describing two waves of constitutional amendments that states adopted after the Civil War
in order to strengthen the autonomy of local governments); Richard Brifault, Our
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 381 (1990)
[hereinafter Brifault, Our Localism: Part II] (discussing how state aid programs integral
to funding newly emerging suburban school districts “allowed suburbs to be politically
separate from the city and still enjoy high-quality municipal services without bearing
unduly burdensome costs”).
34. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128
Yale L.J. 954, 958–59 (2019) [hereinafter Davidson, Dilemma of Localism] (describing
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concerns, we suggest that, in the balance, local discretion to disengage
from immigration enforcement will better serve the goals of immigrant
integration and civic engagement for both citizens and noncitizens alike.
In the end, the emerging federal and state anti-sanctuary trends are
forcing reconsideration of the legal doctrines and theories that underlie
eforts to protect state and local sanctuary policies. This Essay uses the
advent of those trends to promote the thesis that localism and local
autonomy make sense for immigration law, at least as it concerns
enforcement eforts. At the same time, our defense of localism in the
context of immigration enforcement is contingent and guarded. Whether
immigration scholars and advocates are willing to fully embrace
immigration localism may depend on how efectively those same scholars
and advocates manage the risks associated with this form of structural
power allocation. Regardless, our hope is that this Essay spurs an
academic and practical conversation and provides readers with the tools
to assess the costs and beneﬁts of this legal and theoretical shift.
I. THE DIVERGENCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE ANTI-SANCTUARY
A new front in the war against sanctuary cities is emerging. Local
leaders have long contended with federal eforts to compel their
participation in immigration enforcement.35 In recent years, however,
they are ﬁnding themselves facing a new and more formidable foe—their
own states. This Part traces anti-sanctuary eforts at both the federal and
state level. More importantly, this Part explains why the recent wave of
state anti-sanctuary laws consists of statutes that are more expansive,
more punitive, and more efective than their federal counterparts. The
locus of the anti-sanctuary movement is shifting from the federal level to
the states, we argue, because of the way that state anti-sanctuary laws
circumvent many of the federal constitutional limitations that cities and
other localities have used to challenge federal anti-sanctuary eforts thus
far.
A.

The Plight of Federal Anti-Sanctuary

More than any President before him, Trump has placed the crackdown
on sanctuary cities at the center of his Administration’s immigration
enforcement strategy.36 Yet his attacks also follow a long-standing federal
localism as a “double-edged” sword because, conceptually, local autonomy can be used to
advance progressive, conservative, or other causes).
35. See Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1381–84 (2006) [hereinafter
Pham, Local Sovereignty] (examining federal attempts to engage state and local
cooperation in immigration enforcement); infra section I.A.
36. Muzaffar Chisti & Jessica Bolter, Trump Administration Ratchets Up Pressure on
“Sanctuary” Jurisdictions, Migration Policy Inst. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-administration-ratchets-pressure-sanctuary-jurisdictions
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efort to gain local cooperation in the enforcement of federal
immigration law.37 Historically, these eforts have included a mix of
encouragement and prohibitions. In 1996, for example, Congress passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), which added section 287(g) to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), creating a federal program whereby local ofcials
can be trained and “deputized” as federal agents for immigration
enforcement purposes.38 The IIRIRA also included a provision, now
codiﬁed in 8 U.S.C. § 1373, addressing what was then the most common
local sanctuary policy.39 More speciﬁcally, § 1373 made it illegal for state
or local governments to “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government
entity or ofcial from sending to, or receiving from [federal immigration
authorities] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”40 And to this day, § 1373 remains
the sole anti-sanctuary provision that has been enacted into federal law.
Despite Congress’s strong desire to secure local cooperation in 1996,41
the laws that it enacted were notably limited. Speciﬁcally, neither section
287(g) nor § 1373 required local involvement in federal immigration
enforcement.42 As a result, political debates about sanctuary cities
continued to escalate throughout the following decades as both federal
and local policies evolved. On the federal front, starting in the mid2000s, immigration enforcement strategies were increasingly designed
around local participation.43 At the same time, while many cities amended
their local sanctuary policies to permit voluntary communications
between local ofcials and federal immigration authorities in response to
§ 1373, they also added new limitations not speciﬁcally barred by federal
[https://perma.cc/HE92-S9KL]; Sanctuary Cities and Trump’s Immigration Policy, Vox
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/23/17144378/sanctuary-cities-trumpsimmigration-policy [https://perma.cc/U3WE-A7JS].
37. See Pham, Local Sovereignty, supra note 35.
38. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, sec. 133, § 287(g)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(1) (2012)).
39. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 642, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (codiﬁed at 8 U.S.C. § 1373).
40. Id.
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 277 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that
Congress viewed apprehension of undocumented immigrants who remain undetected a
high priority and intended to “give State and local ofcials the authority to communicate
with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, and activities of” undocumented
immigrants); see also Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing the
legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1373).
42. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g), 1373.
43. See Rick Su, The States of Immigration, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1339, 1356–73
(2013) [hereinafter Su, The States of Immigration] (examining the historical trajectory of
state involvement in immigration policymaking and suggesting that “state involvement in
the immigration context has long been driven by political actors seeking to reshape the
federal policy-making process”).
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law, such as prohibitions against inquiring about immigration-related
information or constraints on when local ofcials may detain individuals
solely on the basis of an alleged immigration violation.44 These two
developments began to change the way sanctuary was perceived in the
political ﬁght over immigration. No longer were sanctuary policies simply
a limit on local assistance. Given the centrality of local participation in
the new federal strategy, sanctuary policies were increasingly derided as
an outright attack on federal immigration enforcement itself.
The limited scope of federal anti-sanctuary laws like § 1373 explains
why past presidential administrations largely dealt with local resistance to
federal immigration enforcement through workarounds45 and encouragements.46 The Trump Administration, however, has opted for a more
direct and punitive approach. Within days of his inauguration, Trump
issued Executive Order 13768, which, among other things, denies federal
funds not only to “sanctuary jurisdictions” that “willfully refuse to comply
with 8 U.S.C. 1373” but also to those that have “in efect a statute, policy,
or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement of Federal law.”47
Attorney General Sessions promptly followed through by conditioning
eligibility for a longstanding, Department of Justice–administered law
enforcement grant program on compliance with access and notice
requirements that go well beyond what is required under § 1373.48 At the

44. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Sanctuary Cities, Government Records, and the AntiCommandeering Doctrine, 69 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1553, 1557–59 (2017) (discussing how
New York City changed its policy to comply with § 1373); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,
Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1449, 1455
(2006) (describing a reason for the local shift from “don’t tell” sanctuary policies that are
barred by § 1373 to “don’t ask” and “don’t enforce” policies that arguably are not).
45. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Deportation Program Sows Mistrust, U.S. Is Told, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/politics/deportationprogram-draws-more-criticism.html [https://perma.cc/E5LJ-V6ML] (describing the controversy
over the Secure Communities program, which turned ﬁngerprinting by local law
enforcement into an immigration screening program).
46. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 3, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/us/politics/04immig.html
[https://perma.cc/3WFN-L7ME] (describing the Obama Administration’s decision to expand
the 287(g) program, which “allows for cooperation between federal immigration agents
and state and local police agencies”).
47. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter
Sanctuary Cities E.O.]. More speciﬁcally, section 9(a) of the Executive Order stated that
because it is the policy of the executive branch to ensure that a state and all its political
subdivisions comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, those jurisdictions that refuse to comply with the
statute would not be eligible to receive federal grants. See id. Further, section 9(b)
explained that the Secretary of Homeland Security would publish a list of jurisdictions that
“failed to honor any detainers” with respect to noncitizens who have committed certain
crimes. Id.
48. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 278–80 (2018) (discussing Attorney
General Sessions’s imposition of new conditions on Edward Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grant Program recipients).
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same time, the political attacks against sanctuary cities continued to
escalate.49
Since the implementation of Trump’s Executive Order and the
DOJ’s conditions, a number of localities—including Chicago, Philadelphia,
and Santa Clara County—have gone to court to challenge these federal
eforts to defund sanctuary jurisdictions.50 In turn, a number of federal
courts have issued sweeping injunctions against the Administration’s
policies.51 Some courts held that as a matter of statutory delegation, the
President lacks the power to deny federal funds to sanctuary jurisdictions
without further Congressional authorization.52 In addition, one court
concluded that requiring cities to actively participate in federal immigration
enforcement as a condition of receiving federal grants violates the
Constitution’s prohibition against federal commandeering.53
Indeed, localities have broadened their legal challenges to include
not only the legality of these federal anti-sanctuary eforts but also the
federal law upon which they are based. As a result, there are signs that
§ 1373, the sole federal anti-sanctuary provision, might be violating the
anticommandeering doctrine.54 Thus, although the Trump Administration’s
political attacks on sanctuary cities continue apace, the federal
government’s anti-sanctuary policies have stalled. Not only have Trump’s
efforts to defund sanctuary cities largely been enjoined, but the Administration’s attempt to leverage and expand § 1373 may have also
backﬁred, with the law itself in constitutional jeopardy.

49. See, e.g., Katie Benner et al., Mayors Cancel Meeting with Trump as Justice Dept.
Squeezes Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. Times (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
01/24/us/politics/sanctuary-cities-justice-department.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); see also supra note 36.
50. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive & Mandamus Relief at
1, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-03894MMB), 2018 WL 626280; Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 5, City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-5720), 2017 WL
3386388; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3–4, County of Santa Clara v.
Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 317-cv-00574-WHO), 2017 WL 412999.
51. City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 593 (issuing a nationwide injunction against
anti-sanctuary conditions on the Justice Assistance Grant Program); City of Chicago, 264 F.
Supp. 3d at 951 (same).
52. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 646; City of Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at
943.
53. See County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1215–16 (N.D. Cal.
2017).
54. See City of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 651; City of Chicago, 264 F. Supp. 3d at
949. The courts reconsidered their earlier holdings on the constitutionality of § 1373
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, which held that for Tenth
Amendment purposes, the distinction between precluding and afrmatively requiring
state action was “empty.” 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions,
321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 866–73 (N.D. Ill. 2018); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp.
3d 289, 329–31 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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The Rise of State Anti-Sanctuary

While federal anti-sanctuary eforts have stalled, a separate but
parallel anti-sanctuary campaign is mounting. In the past four years,
seven states have enacted anti-sanctuary laws,55 including S.B. 4 in Texas,
which has been the subject of intense litigation and public scrutiny.56
Meanwhile, similar laws have been introduced or passed in at least
seventeen states.57 To be sure, state anti-sanctuary laws are not new.58
Moreover, they have long been intertwined with anti-sanctuary eforts at
the federal level.59 But the most recent wave reveals some alarming
trends. Their numbers are growing, their scope expanding, their
penalties more severe. Taken together, state anti-sanctuary laws today
represent the most significant effort thus far to conscript local officials into
federal immigration enforcement.
The expanding scope of today’s state anti-sanctuary laws is most
apparent with respect to how sanctuary is deﬁned. States are increasingly
turning to catch-all provisions to deﬁne the types of sanctuary measures
that are prohibited. Indiana and North Carolina, for example, prohibit
cities from limiting or restricting their involvement in immigration
enforcement to anything “less than the full extent permitted by federal
law.”60 States are also beginning to target local activities that fall short of
formal policies. For example, Texas’s anti-sanctuary law applies to
“patterns and practice[s]”61 and forbids mere expressions of support for
sanctuary policies by punishing local officials who “endorse” any limitations
on their city’s involvement in immigration enforcement.62 Similarly, Iowa’s

55. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5 (2018); Ind. Code §§ 5-2-18.2-3–4 (2018); Miss. Code
Ann. § 25-1-119 (2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 153A-145.5, 160A-205.2 (2018); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 4-42-103 (2019); S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed
at Iowa Code § 825.4).
56. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codiﬁed at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053
(2017)); see also City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Before SB4
could go into efect, several Texas cities, counties, local law-enforcement and city ofcials,
and advocacy groups challenged the law in three consolidated actions.”).
57. See supra note 13.
58. Anti-sanctuary measures, for example, were included in two controversial state
eforts to regulate immigration: Proposition 187, a voter initiative passed by California in
1994, and S.B. 1070, enacted by the Arizona legislature in 2010. See League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (upholding a
preliminary injunction against California’s Proposition 187); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2010). Arizona’s S.B. 1070 also spawned similar anti-sanctuary legislation in
other states. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 29-29-101 (2012) (repealed 2013); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 36-80-23 (2012); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 6-1-170 (2011).
59. See infra section I.C.
60. Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-4; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-205.2.
61. Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(2).
62. Id. § 752.051(a)(1). A preliminary injunction against this “endorsement” provision
was recently upheld by a federal appellate court, but only with respect to elected local
ofcials. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 185 (5th Cir. 2018).
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law targets “informal, unwritten polic[ies],”63 and local ofcials cannot
“discourage” any other ofcial from inquiring about immigration status
or assisting in immigration enforcement.64 Finally, a proposed bill in
Florida covers “procedures” and “customs”65 and prohibits local
representatives from voting in favor of a sanctuary policy irrespective of
whether such a policy is actually enacted or implemented.66
This expanding scope is being paired with new mandates with
respect to what cities must do. Federal law does not require local ofcials
to assist federal immigration enforcement eforts, much less actively
engage in federal immigration enforcement themselves. Even the
“immigration detainers” issued by the federal government are, as many
courts have now held, simply requests that local law enforcement ofcials
continue to maintain custody of an individual suspected of unauthorized
entry, but not an order that they do so.67 State anti-sanctuary laws,
however, are now making mandatory what had long been discretionary.
States like Iowa and Tennessee now require all local law enforcement
agencies in the state to comply with federal detainer requests.68 In
addition, Texas also requires local ofcials to notify federal authorities
about the release of anyone suspected to be an unauthorized immigrant
and allow federal ofcials full access to local detention facilities.69
Alabama’s law goes even further and subcontracts local ofcials to the
federal government by requiring them to “fully comply with and . . .
support the enforcement of federal [immigration] law.”70
Finally, penalties for violating the statutes in the most recent wave of
state anti-sanctuary laws have become more severe. Traditionally, when a
local policy is preempted by state law that policy is simply rendered
unenforceable. In the anti-sanctuary context, however, states are imposing
sanctions directly upon local residents and ofcials.71 Nearly all of the
63. S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed at Iowa Code
§ 825.1).
64. Id. § 825.4.
65. H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Fla. 2018).
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that “a
conclusion that a detainer issued by a federal agency is an order that state and local
agencies are compelled to follow, is inconsistent with the anti-commandeering principle of
the Tenth Amendment”).
68. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-42-102(3)(D), 4-42-103 (2019); S.F. 481, 87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed at Iowa Code § 825.2).
69. Tex. Gov’t Code § 772.0073 (2017) (requiring that local entities “enforc[e]
immigration laws” and “comply[] with, honor[], or fulﬁll[] immigration detainer
requests” to receive funds from the Enforcement of Immigration Law Grant Program).
70. Ala. Code § 31-13-5(b) (2018).
71. See, e.g., Brifault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 1997 (“Several states have
adopted punitive preemption laws that do not merely nullify inconsistent local rules—the
traditional efect of preemption—but rather impose harsh penalties on local ofcials or
governments simply for having such measures on their books.”).
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new anti-sanctuary laws being considered or enacted deny state funding
to any city or locality that violates their prohibitions or mandates.72 In
addition, states like Texas now authorize ﬁnes, sometimes as high as
$25,000 a day, against cities that fail to comply.73 States are also seeking to
make local communities legally liable for the actions of unauthorized
immigrants. A bill proposed in North Carolina, for example, strips cities
that violate its anti-sanctuary statute of all governmental tort immunity
for any crime committed by an undocumented immigrant.74 The
proposed anti-sanctuary bill in Florida goes even further by allowing
anyone to sue a sanctuary city for personal injury or property damage
committed by an unauthorized immigrant.75
Even more troubling are the escalating sanctions against local
ofcials themselves. Local ofcials who violate Texas’s anti-sanctuary law
can be forced out of ofce, and those who fail to comply with a federal
immigration detainer request can be charged with a crime.76 In Alabama,
ﬁnes are levied not against the community as a whole but rather directly
against the local ofcials themselves.77 Indeed, even if an ofcial does not
personally violate the anti-sanctuary law, she can still be charged with a
crime in Alabama for failing to report a violation committed by someone
else.78 Iowa’s anti-sanctuary law does not punish local ofcials directly.
Nevertheless, it too threatens local ofcials with removal by allowing state
funding to be restored earlier if the ofcials responsible for the antisanctuary violation leave their positions.79
In substance and scope, then, the recent wave of state anti-sanctuary
laws is more expansive and punitive than what has been attempted thus
far at the federal level, even by the Trump Administration. But whereas
cities are successfully challenging federal anti-sanctuary eforts in court,80
state anti-sanctuary laws have largely avoided judicial scrutiny. Among the
seven anti-sanctuary laws that were recently enacted, only one—S.B. 4 in
Texas81—has faced serious legal challenge. And while the cities and
counties challenging S.B. 4 prevailed at the district court level, the
injunction was largely overturned by the Fifth Circuit on appeal.82
72. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 752.053, 752.056–.0565; Iowa S.F. 481; H.B. 2315, 110th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018); S.B. 145, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017).
73. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.056.
74. See N.C. S.B. 145.
75. See H.B. 9, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018).
76. Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.0565; Tex. Penal Code § 39.07 (2017).
77. See Ala. Code § 31-13-5(d) (2018).
78. See id. § 31-13-5(f).
79. See S.F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed at Iowa
Code § 825.10).
80. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
81. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)).
82. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 191–92 (5th Cir. 2018). The challenging
cities prevailed only on First Amendment grounds, with the court upholding the district
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The Legal Distinction Between Federal and State Anti-Sanctuary

While both federal and state anti-sanctuary attacks are politically
intertwined and directed toward the same goal, their legal fortunes
appear to be diverging. Although it is the federal government that is
presumed to possess plenary power over immigration and exclusive
authority over its enforcement,83 in the anti-sanctuary context it is state
law that appears to be succeeding when federal eforts have failed.
This outcome is not so peculiar when viewed in light of the type of
legal challenges localities can raise against these federal and state antisanctuary eforts. Until now, local governments have largely relied on
exploiting the federalism divide between the federal government and the
states in challenging federal anti-sanctuary eforts and state immigration
laws.84 Cities can assume the legal standing of the state in arguing that
federal anti-sanctuary laws impinge upon state sovereignty.85 They can
also assume the legal position of the federal government in asserting that
state immigration laws are preempted by federal law.86 But the structure
court’s injunction with respect to the law’s prohibition against the “endorsement” of
policies that materially limit immigration enforcement, but solely with respect to elected
ofcials. See id. at 185.
83. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
609–10 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, . . . the right to its exercise at any
time . . . cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.”); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 255, 255 (explaining that the plenary power doctrine causes the Court to view
federal immigration statutes permissively). For an argument that the plenary power
doctrine still persists today despite attempts to undermine it, see Rubenstein &
Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 594.
84. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 948 (N.D. Ill. 2017)
(discussing the legal protections of state sovereignty in the context of a city directing its
employees not to comply with a federal program).
86. The City of Los Angeles, for example, intervened as a plaintif to argue that
Proposition 187 was preempted by federal law. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 n.2, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1997). In the federal government’s
challenge against Arizona’s S.B. 1070, local ofcials provided declarations that the federal
government included with its initial complaint. See Declaration of Tony Estrada at 2,
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/opa/legacy/2010/07/06/declaration-of-tonyestrada.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ9T-5N5M] (arguing that the Arizona law would shift
scarce police resources away from “combating serious crime”); Declaration of Phoenix
Police Chief Jack Harris at 1–2, Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-jack-harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q9GG-XW7H] (arguing that the Arizona law would have a negative efect on police
relations with the community); Declaration of Roberto Villaseñor at 3, Arizona, 703 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/
opa/legacy/2010/07/06/declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMS532GK] (arguing that the Arizona law would unwisely force local police to enforce
immigration laws over serious crimes, such as drug trafficking). Arizona cities later filed
briefs as amici in support of the federal government’s preemption claim. See Amicus Curiae
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of state anti-sanctuary laws and their unique interaction with federal law
deny cities and other localities the ability to raise the same kind of
federal constitutional claims that they have successfully used in the past.
It is for this reason, this Essay argues, that state anti-sanctuary laws are
proliferating at precisely the same time that federal anti-sanctuary eforts
are stalling.
To see this requires us to recognize two features of our federal
system. The ﬁrst is that while the Constitution gives the federal
government broad authority to preempt state and local laws, especially
with respect to immigration, the federalism structure of the United States
also prohibits the federal government from commandeering states to
implement federal policies.87 The second is that while cities and other
localities often act as independent governments, as a matter of law they
are largely understood to be nothing more than creatures of the state.88
It is in large part because of the anticommandeering doctrine that
federal anti-sanctuary eforts thus far have been so limited. Here we have
to remember that the federal interest in anti-sanctuary is not simply in
repealing local sanctuary policies but more speciﬁcally in compelling the
active participation of local governments in federal immigration
enforcement. And while the anticommandeering doctrine is principally
concerned about the sovereignty of states, as “creatures of the state,”
cities and other localities have historically assumed the legal standing of
their states in contesting federal commandeering.89 This is why the sole
Brief of the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, & Somerton in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645), 2010
WL 5162523; Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted by the City of Tucson in Support of PlaintiffAppellee, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162524.
87. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal
government cannot circumvent the anticommandeering doctrine “by conscripting the
States’ ofcers directly” or “those [ofcers] of their political subdivisions”); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”).
88. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (explaining that the
power of the state to modify the privileges of, or repeal the charter of and destroy,
municipalities is “unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States”).
It is worth noting, however, that there have been competing formulations of the state–
local relationship. See, e.g., People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871)
(Cooley, J., concurring) (arguing that local government is an “absolute right” protected
from the powers of the legislatures); Eugene McQuillan, A Treatise on the Law of
Municipal Corporations § 190, at 268 (1st ed. 1911) (arguing that the right to local selfgovernment is a “private” right not subject to state supremacy); see also generally Gerald
E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1111–12 (1980) (describing
and critiquing the emergence of the state creature conceptualization of cities in American
law).
89. This is why so many of the seminal federalism decisions of the Supreme Court on
state rights involve legal challenges from cities and counties, rather than states themselves.
See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (brought by local
transportation authority); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (brought by
cities). Justice Stevens remarked on this trend in his dissenting opinion in Printz. Printz,
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anti-sanctuary provision in federal law, § 1373,90 cannot and does not
require local governments to communicate with federal authorities.91
The anticommandeering doctrine also explains why cities have been so
efective in blocking the Trump Administration’s eforts to deny federal
funding to local jurisdictions that refuse to comply with immigration
detainers, provide notice of an immigrant’s release, or allow the federal
government access to local facilities to assume custody of detained
immigrants.92 Moreover, recent decisions by lower courts to hold that
§ 1373 is itself unconstitutional—as limited as it is—are based on the
recent expansion of the anticommandeering doctrine by the Supreme
Court to cover not only federal mandates for afrmative state or local
action but also federal eforts to prohibit states and localities from taking
speciﬁc actions.93
State law preemption, however, offers anti-sanctuary proponents a legal
means of working around the constraints of the anticommandeering
doctrine. The anticommandeering doctrine is derived from the
federalism structure outlined by the U.S. Constitution and the independent
sovereignty that it preserves in the several states.94 The Constitution,
however, accords no such status to cities in their dealings with the state.95
Indeed, the “state creature” idea that allows cities to become the state
when contesting federal law cuts against them when the commandeering
argument is directed against their own state.96 After all, if localities are
521 U.S. at 955 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]hese cases do not involve the enlistment
of state ofcials at all, but only an efort to have federal policy implemented by ofcials of
local government.”).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
91. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
§ 1373 does not commandeer local ofcials because it “prohibit[s] state and local
governmental entities or ofcials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of
immigration information” (emphasis added)).
92. Technically, the federal government possesses the “power of the purse” to
condition federal funding on requirements that it cannot enact directly through federal
law. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205–06 (1987). But the Supreme Court
has also held that when the condition is coercive and compels the relinquishment of a
constitutional right, the federal government creates an “unconstitutional condition.” See
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–81 (2012). It is on this ground
that courts have called into question federal defunding efforts against sanctuary jurisdcitions.
See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1216 (2017) (enjoining the
denial of federal funding because the anti-sanctuary conditions unconstitutionally coerce
localities to adopt a federal regulatory program in violation of the Tenth Amendment
prohibition against commandeering); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579,
651 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (noting that anti-sanctuary conditions attached to federal funding
“implicate the Tenth Amendment and its built-in anti-commandeering principles,” but
granting a preliminary injunction on other grounds).
93. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1479–81 (2018).
94. See id. at 1479.
95. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 1163,
1217 (2018).
96. See id.
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simply administrative subdivisions of the state, as the Supreme Court has
at times described them,97 then their “commandeering” by states may not
only be constitutionally permitted, but constitutionally encouraged. And
as creatures and subdivisions, it might also be constitutionally expected
for states to be able to punish localities for noncompliance with state law
in ways that the federal government cannot.
As a result, threats of state defunding have not met the same fate as
federal defunding.98 Cities may feel just as, if not more, coerced when the
state conditions grant funding on the repeal of local sanctuary policies.
In fact, cities tend to be far more reliant on state aid than they are on
federal.99 But localities do not have a federal constitutional right to be
free from state commandeering.100 Thus, while making all state funding
contingent on local participation in federal immigration enforcement
might be coercive, such conditions do not force cities and other localities
to give up a federal constitutional right. By turning to state law, then,
anti-sanctuary advocates are able to compel local participation in ways
that federal law cannot.
Moreover, state anti-sanctuary laws have been able to avoid preemption
themselves because of existing federal anti-sanctuary policies. Indeed,
preemption was precisely what befell Proposition 187, which was adopted
by California voters in 1994 and included the ﬁrst anti-sanctuary
provision enacted into law.101 A federal district court enjoined its
implementation for infringing upon the federal government’s exclusive
authority over immigration regulation and its enforcement.102 Since
Proposition 187, and perhaps in response to its defeat,103 however,
Congress amended federal law to encourage precisely the kind of local
participation that states are now seeking to mandate. This included the
1996 addition of section 287(g) and § 1373.104 Federal encouragement is
97. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (describing local
governments as “political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them”).
98. See supra sections I.A–.B.
99. See, e.g., David Berman, Local Government and the States: Autonomy, Politics,
and Policy 92 (Routledge 2015) (2003) (explaining that about thirty-ﬁve percent of cities’
total revenue comes from state governments, while only four percent comes from the
federal government).
100. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1217.
101. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D.
Cal. 1995) (describing Proposition 187’s provisions, which required law enforcement and
other local government personnel to check “the immigration status of persons with whom
they come in contact,” report the individuals “to state and federal ofcials,” and “deny
those persons social services, health care, and education”).
102. See id. at 786–87.
103. See Su, The States of Immigration, supra note 43, at 1373–78 (describing how
“political actors . . . were able to leverage” Proposition 187’s defeat in court “into a
national controversy that made federal reforms much more likely”).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
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also expressed in a separate provision of § 1373 that speciﬁcally requires
the federal government to respond to all inquiries about immigration
status that it receives from local law enforcement.105 These amendments
and the increasing federal reliance on local cooperation are why the
Supreme Court, when asked to rule on the constitutionality of a
controversial immigration enforcement law enacted by Arizona in 2010,
upheld the law’s anti-sanctuary mandate despite ﬁnding the rest of the
law preempted.106 As the Court noted, the “federal scheme” now in place
“leaves room for a policy requiring state ofcials to contact ICE as a
routine matter.”107 Similarly, in City of El Cenizo v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the localities’ federal preemption argument against S.B. 4
because of the various encouragements of local involvement in
immigration enforcement found in federal law.108
In short, state anti-sanctuary laws are proliferating precisely because
of the legal advantages they possess over their federal counterparts. They
are free from the federal constitutional constraints that have limited
federal anti-sanctuary eforts thus far. Unlike other state immigration
laws in the past, they also avoid federal preemption because of the extent
to which they further federal interests and are intertwined with federal
law. The consequence is that cities and other localities are denied the
traditional legal strategies that have served them well in the past. If local
sanctuary policies are to be defended against the rise of state antisanctuary laws, a new set of legal arguments will need to be developed.
II. STATE ANTI-SANCTUARY THROUGH A LOCALIST LENS
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in City of El Cenizo v. Texas illustrates the
uphill legal battle that localities face in challenging state anti-sanctuary
laws on federal constitutional grounds. But its treatment of an ancillary
and largely overlooked local autonomy argument, based in part on the
Texas constitution,109 also suggests the possibility of a diferent frame of
analysis and a separate line of attack. When viewed through a lens of
localism rather than federalism, the proliferation of these state laws also
calls attention to the need to examine in closer detail how they ﬁt within
the legal structure that governs the relation between states and their
localities. This Part explores what an immigration localism analysis might
look like. In addition, it shines light on the doctrinal insights and legal
claims that such an analysis reveals.
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012) (“[INS] shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal,
State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose
authorized by law, by providing the requested veriﬁcation or status information.”).
106. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411–13, 416 (2012).
107. Id. at 412–13.
108. See 890 F.3d 164, 176–82 (5th Cir. 2018).
109. See id. at 191.
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Of course, to say that localism matters in the state anti-sanctuary
context does not mean that immigration localism arguments will
guarantee legal victory for cities. Litigating in federal court, the local
plaintifs in El Cenizo chose to frame their local autonomy argument
through a federal constitutional lens—what the court described as a
“hybrid Tenth Amendment and [federal] preemption claim.”110 And
although the Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that it need not address
this argument because it was not raised at the district court level,111 the
court also dismissed the argument on substantive grounds. Because the
Texas Constitution “prohibits a city from acting in a manner inconsistent
with the general laws of the state,” the court explained,112 the state clearly
has the power to “‘commandeer’ its municipalities in this way.”113
But the indirect means by which localism was raised in El Cenizo, and
the cursory manner in which it was dismissed, also suggest the need for
further inquiry. Was the Fifth Circuit correct in concluding that the
state’s power to preempt necessarily includes the power to commandeer?
And if that is indeed the case in Texas, is it the same in other states?
Answering these questions requires a closer look at how state constitutions
and laws deﬁne the relationship between states and their localities, how
that relationship varies between states, and the nuances connected with
that legal development over time. Moreover, the particular features of
state anti-sanctuary laws today could implicate localism concerns in ways
that difer from other state preemption statutes. Ultimately, we conclude
that localism makes possible a set of heretofore unrecognized legal
claims and doctrinal considerations that certain localities might use to
stem the coming tide of state anti-sanctuary legislation.
A.

Localism and the Legal Standing of Localities

To understand the signiﬁcance of localism in the anti-sanctuary
context, we have to go beyond the fact that cities and other localities are
mere “creatures of the state.”114 It is also important to examine how the
state–local relationship is deﬁned as a matter of state law. Here, we show
that the power of states over localities is not absolute. Indeed, like the
trajectory of federalism, the development of localism in many states has
been toward expanding local autonomy and increasing limits on state
interference.
The power of local governments is one area that has seen this
expansion of local autonomy. This expansion is evident in the fact that
the vast majority of states have moved their localism structure away from

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Tyra v. City of Houston, 822 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. 1991)).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
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“Dillon’s Rule” and toward “home rule.”115 To be sure, both doctrines
presume that, as state creatures, cities and localities possess only those
powers that have been speciﬁcally delegated to them by the state.116 How
they difer is in the extent of the state’s delegation and how courts are
instructed to interpret them.
In “Dillon’s Rule” states, for example, the power of localities tends
to be limited to a speciﬁc list of enumerated powers.117 Moreover, the
doctrine instructs courts to interpret the scope of such delegations
narrowly and presume against ﬁnding such delegation in close cases.118
For individuals, private corporations, and state governments, the
standard view is that they have the power and freedom to act unless
speciﬁcally prohibited by state or federal law.119 Dillon’s Rule, however,
reverses that baseline presumption for local governments: They are
assumed to have no power to do anything unless an express or implied
state delegation of authority can be identiﬁed.120
In contrast, localities in home-rule states are granted a blanket
delegation of power. This often includes the authority to enact local
regulations without the need for further state authorization.121 Similarly,
localities in home-rule states typically possess the ability to determine
their own governmental structure through the adoption of a home-rule
charter, in which the roles and responsibilities of local ofcials are
deﬁned.122 Of course, such broad delegations of home-rule authority are
not without constraints. In many states, the scope of a locality’s homerule powers is limited to matters of municipal or local afairs.123
Furthermore, most states still require local laws to be consistent with state

115. See Dale Krane et al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook 14 (2001)
(noting that home rule had been adopted in some form in forty-ﬁve states); Jon C.
Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870–1900, at 103–31
(1984) (describing the origins of municipal home rule in the 1870s and its subsequent
expansion).
116. This is not unlike our understanding of federal power under federalism—namely,
that the federal government’s authority is largely limited to the “enumerated powers” that
were ceded by the states when the Constitution was ratiﬁed.
117. See, e.g., John F. Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 89 (1st
ed. 1872).
118. See id. § 17.
119. See id. §§ 18–19.
120. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 270 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (noting that Dillon’s Rule refers to the concept that “cities possess only those
powers that can be traced to explicit delegations of authority from the state” and that
“cities are powerless to act” in the absence of such delegations); see also Frug, supra note
88, at 1111–12.
121. See, e.g., 1 Chester James Antieau, Antieau’s Local Government: Municipal
Corporation Law §§ 3.20–3.22 (1998).
122. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2257, 2290 (2003)
[hereinafter Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule]; see also infra section II.B.1.
123. See Frug, supra note 88, at 1117.
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laws, preserving in the state the power to preempt.124 Nevertheless, the
widespread adoption of home rule itself reﬂects the legal trend among
states toward expanding the power of local self-governance.125
Another area in which the localism relationship has developed involves
the protection of localities from state interference.126 In the nineteenth
century, state legislatures frequently meddled in local afairs.127 In
response, many state constitutions were amended to limit their ability to
do so. Nearly all state constitutions now prohibit the state from enacting
“local laws” or “special legislation” that targets or applies only to speciﬁc
localities.128 Indeed, in some states, home rule does not just empower
localities to regulate local afairs; it also grants such local laws immunity
from state preemption.129 Over time, further protections have been
added as well. For example, since the 1970s, more than a dozen states
have adopted constitutional amendments that prohibit the state from
imposing “unfunded mandates” that expand the responsibilities of local
governments but do not provide sufficient state funds to carry them out.130

124. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties . . . shall have all powers of local
self-government not inconsistent with general law . . . .”); see also Paul Diller, Intrastate
Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1124–27 (2007).
125. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 122, at 2277–88; Rick Su, Have
Cities Abandoned Home Rule?, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 181, 190–91 (2017).
126. See Antieau, supra note 121, § 3.00 (describing home rule’s evolution from a
Missouri constitutional amendment that was adopted in 1875). As a matter of law, home
rule is not necessarily inconsistent with Dillon’s Rule; if Dillon’s Rule presumes that
localities possess only those powers that have been delegated by state law, home rule serves
as one form that such a delegation can take. But because the home rule delegation is so
expansive, it is now common practice to classify states as either a home-rule or Dillon’s
Rule state. See, e.g., Krane et al., supra note 115, at 14 –15. Moreover, within these broad
classiﬁcations, variations exist with respect to how home rule or Dillon’s Rule is structured
in any particular state. Id.
127. See, e.g., Howard Lee McBain, The Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule
263–64 (1916) (describing an 1899 lawsuit that challenged the ability of the California
legislature to interfere with “municipal afairs”—in particular, local elections); Nancy
Burns & Gerald Gamm, Creatures of the State: State Politics and Local Government, 18711921, 33 Urb. Af. Rev. 59, 62 (1997) (compiling data from the Alabama, Massachusetts,
and Michigan state legislatures between 1871 and 1921 to demonstrate the outsized
inﬂuence that state governments wielded in local afairs).
128. See Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, supra note 122, at 2286–88 (describing
eforts to rein in states’ power to “enact ‘special legislation’ that would apply only to
particular localities”).
129. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(a) (empowering charter cities to “make and
enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal afairs, subject only to
restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other
matters they shall be subject to general laws”); Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6 (“The people of
each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants . . . are
hereby vested with . . . power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or
town, which shall . . . extend to all its local and municipal matters.”).
130. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Politics: Governing by Amendment in the
American States 45–47 (2018) (describing state constitutional amendments that bar
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Of course, the powers and protections of a particular locality depend
on the speciﬁc localism structure in place in a given state. As such, the
signiﬁcance of localism in the state anti-sanctuary context varies not only
between states but also sometimes between localities within a state.
Consider, for example, some of the states that are now involved in the
anti-sanctuary wave. Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia remain pure Dillon’s
Rule states, having never embraced the home-rule movement.131 Iowa
and North Carolina have both adopted home rule, but in the former
home rule was adopted via constitutional amendment,132 while in the
latter it exists purely as a statutory enactment subject to legislative
exception.133 In Texas, home rule has been extended to major cities but
speciﬁcally excludes counties, which leaves sanctuary jurisdictions like
Travis County and its sherif operating under Dillon’s Rule.134 And while
nearly all states have some kind of prohibition on special legislation,
including those now considered Dillon’s Rule states, limitations on
unfunded mandates exist in only a few, such as Florida and Tennessee.135
Moreover, how localism developments might translate into concrete
legal claims requires further consideration. It is worth noting that many
local-government-law scholars believe that the powers and protections
that have been extended to localities often fail to live up to their
promise—hobbled as they often are by narrow judicial constructions or
creative state circumventions. Finally, localism claims remain, for the
most part, untested and underdeveloped, especially in the context of
immigration.
So what might cities and their advocates gain by turning to localism
in the anti-sanctuary context? It is to this that we now turn.

unfunded mandates outright or require states to shoulder at least some of the ﬁnancial
burden).
131. See, e.g., Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893, 902
(Ala. 1981) (“The governmental entity involved here, a municipality, derives all of its
power from the state, and no municipality can legislate beyond what the state has either
expressly or impliedly authorized.”); H.G. Brown Family Ltd. v. City of Villa Rica, 607
S.E.2d 883, 885 (Ga. 2005) (“A municipality has no inherent power; it may only exercise
power to the extent it has been delegated authority by the state. A municipality’s
allocations of power from the state must be strictly construed.”); City of Richmond v.
Confrere Club, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va. 1990) (“In determining the legislative powers of
local governing bodies, Virginia follows the Dillon Rule of strict construction.”).
132. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A.
133. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-11 (2018).
134. See Forwood v. City of Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. 1948) (establishing
home rule for cities and towns); George D. Braden et al., The Constitution of the State of
Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 652 (1977), https://www.sll.texas.gov/
assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CYN-GHR6] (describing the adoption and repeal of county home
rule in Texas).
135. See Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18(a); Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24.
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The Localist Case Against State Anti-Sanctuary Legislation

Drawing upon the localism structures outlined above, this section
illustrates how localism might be used to contest the rise of state antisanctuary legislation. Doing so requires turning a close eye toward the
unique legal structure of today’s anti-sanctuary legislation and more
speciﬁcally the ways in which those laws difer from other state
preemption statutes. The claims discussed below are not meant to be
exhaustive. Nor do we believe that such claims are possible in all states or
against every type of state anti-sanctuary legislation. Indeed, our goal is
simply to provide some examples of what a localist analysis might reveal.
Moreover, this section sheds light on how localism might already be
inﬂuencing the manner in which state anti-sanctuary laws are drafted and
how it might be used to shape—both legally and politically—the
development of state anti-sanctuary more generally.
1. Home Rule as Anticommandeering. — Cities and other localities
cannot invoke the federal anticommandeering doctrine in challenging
state anti-sanctuary legislation. But something akin to a “state anticommandeering” claim might be raised in home-rule states. Such a claim
would not be based, of course, on the Federal Constitution.136 Nevertheless,
state constitutional provisions, especially those connected with the
adoption of home rule, might serve as the basis for such an argument.
To our knowledge, no state court has explicitly adopted a state
anticommandeering doctrine in name. Yet in many states, such a
doctrine may already exist in efect. Just as federal law distinguishes
between permissible federal preemption and unconstitutional federal
commandeering,137 state courts often do the same in interpreting the
power of states in the context of home rule. A state may have broad
authority to preempt local regulations. But, as we note below, courts have
also held that states cannot direct the activities of local ofcials, or alter
their duties and responsibilities, without running afoul of home rule.
After all, home rule was adopted in many states in response to forcible
state takeovers of municipal departments—such as ﬁre and police—

136. However, there have been some eforts to develop a state anticommandeering
doctrine based on the Federal Constitution. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1218–19
(proposing local anticommandeering principles as a tentative solution to eforts by the
federal government to compel municipal ofcials to enforce federal immigration law); cf.
David J. Barron, Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 487, 611 (1999) (arguing that despite not being mentioned in the Federal
Constitution, localities have federal constitutional standing against their own states).
137. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476–77 (2018) (describing the
constitutional distinction between federal laws that regulate individuals directly by “requiring
or prohibiting certain acts,” which Congress can do, and those that “directly . . . compel
the States to require or prohibit those acts,” which it cannot).
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which were common in the nineteenth century.138 And as noted above,
one of the central powers delegated by home rule was the ability of local
residents to frame municipal charters deﬁning the structure of their local
government and the roles and responsibilities of its ofcials.139 In this
regard, the motivations behind home rule echo the same concerns
behind the federal anticommandeering doctrine: to preserve and protect
the independence and structural integrity of local governments.
Indeed, cases prohibiting “state commandeering” can be found in a
number of different states. In Missouri, for example, the state constitution
speciﬁcally bars the state from “creating or ﬁxing the powers, duties, or
compensation of any municipal ofce or employment” of a home-rule
city.140 As a result, Missouri courts have struck down state laws requiring a
city to create an arbitration board141 or mandating that local ofcials
serve on a board of examiners created by the state.142 In Ohio, courts
have held that, under the state’s home-rule amendment, the “internal
government of a municipality, such as . . . the powers, duties, and
functions of municipal ofcers, are matters of local government, which
may not be inﬂuenced or controlled by [state] laws.”143 Thus, the state
cannot regulate how a city selects its police chief144 or otherwise control
“the organization and regulation of its police force.”145 Other states
similarly protect the independence of localities in managing their
personnel and how local ofcials are removed.146 To be sure, not all
138. See, e.g., McBain, supra note 127, at 35–39, 498 (describing, inter alia, an
instance of “patent subterfuge,” in which the New York legislature co-opted local control
of certain municipal police departments, and similar eforts by Colorado’s legislature).
139. See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
140. Mo. Const. art. VI, § 22.
141. See State ex rel. Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. 1968).
142. See State ex rel. Sprague v. City of St. Joseph, 549 S.W.2d 873, 881 (Mo. 1977).
143. Lorain St. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 148 N.E. 577, 580 (Ohio 1925) (Marshall,
C.J., concurring); see also State ex rel. Strain v. Huston, 29 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ohio Ct. App.
1940) (holding that the power to create local ofces, determine “when the performance of
the duties of the office are distributed among subordinates,” and “prescribe rules and
regulations to govern the time and manner of service by subordinates” is a matter of local
self-government immune from state control).
144. State ex rel. Lynch v. City of Cleveland, 132 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ohio 1956) (holding
that a city is not subject to state law in how it selects its police chief).
145. Harsney v. Allen, 113 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Ohio 1953) (“The organization and regulation of
its police force, as well as its civil service functions, are within a municipality’s powers of local
self-government.”).
146. See, e.g., State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Oehler, 16 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn. 1944)
(holding that adoption of a home-rule charter granted a municipality general legislative
powers, including the power to remove a municipal ofcial); Goodwin v. Oklahoma City,
182 P.2d 762, 764 (Okla. 1947) (holding that the city charter provisions regarding the
termination of “appointed ofcers or employees[] are solely matters of municipal concern
and control over the general laws”); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1245–47
(Pa. 2004) (holding that granting domestic-partnership beneﬁts to employees in same-sex
relationships is within a locality’s power over personnel and administration and not subject
to the state’s power to regulate marriage or civil rights).
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home-rule states have ruled against commandeering in this manner; in
most states there are no decisions either way, and in others courts have
explicitly upheld the state’s ability to dictate the duties and responsibilities
of local officials.147 But these decisions suggest that localism is not necessarily
blind to the distinction between preemption and commandeering that
federalism draws.
Just as federal anti-sanctuary eforts are limited by the federal
anticommandeering doctrine, perhaps state anti-sanctuary laws are similarly
constrained. After all, even more so than federal anti-sanctuary eforts,
the goal of state anti-sanctuary laws is not merely to repeal local sanctuary
policies but more speciﬁcally to ﬁx the power and duties of local ofcials.
Anti-sanctuary mandates direct local ofcials to take speciﬁc actions,
including those that may not be authorized or approved by the local
governments that they work for or the local residents that they serve.148
Anti-sanctuary penalties threaten local ofcials with personal sanctions
unless they choose to comply with the state’s demand that they prioritize
federal immigration enforcement eforts above all other local
responsibilities.149
State anti-sanctuary laws may not be directly taking over municipal
departments in the same way that they have done in the past. But the
extent to which many state anti-sanctuary laws require localities to
comply with all federal requests for assistance or action renders them, in
efect, auxiliary departments of the federal government. In other words,
if state preemption laws ordinarily concern what local governments can
regulate, anti-sanctuary legislation targets how local governments are
organized, structured, and managed.
But if anti-sanctuary mandates implicate commandeering under
home rule, can the same be said about state anti-sanctuary laws that
contain only prohibitions? Just as 8 U.S.C. § 1373 avoids federal
anticommandeering concerns,150 many state anti-sanctuary laws also
impose no afrmative requirements and simply forbid the enactment of

147. See State ex rel. Young v. Robinson, 112 N.W. 269, 270 (Minn. 1907) (explaining
that when state laws operate within a municipality, “the municipality and its ofcers are . . .
subject to the command and control[] of the state government at all times”); State ex rel.
Burns v. Linn, 153 P. 826, 826 (Okla. 1915) (holding that the state of Oklahoma may
impose duties and penalties upon local ofcers of the city of Tulsa). Interestingly,
Minnesota and Oklahoma are the two states in which courts held that the removal of local
ofcials is entirely a local afair not subject to state regulations. See Robinson, 112 N.W. at
270; Linn, 153 P. at 830.
148. See supra section I.B.
149. See supra section I.B.
150. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
§ 1373 does not commandeer local ofcials because it “prohibit[s] state and local
governmental entities or ofcials only from directly restricting the voluntary exchange of
immigration information”).
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local sanctuary policies.151 Styling the anti-sanctuary law as a prohibition,
however, may not be enough to save it from a commandeering claim.
First, even if state anti-sanctuary laws rely entirely on prohibitions in
theory, the breadth of those prohibitions may nevertheless constitute an
implicit mandate in practice. By banning both formal policies and
informal customs that limit cooperation with federal immigration
authorities, local governments are essentially left with no alternative other
than to permit or encourage such cooperation. Further, the escalating
punitive measures152 strongly incentivize, if not directly compel, local
ofcials to interpret such prohibition as afrmative mandates lest they
risk losing state funding or facing personal sanctions. As noted earlier,
federal courts are now reaching a similar conclusion in their analysis of
§ 1373, which mirrors state anti-sanctuary in simply prohibiting local
policies that limit local participation in immigration enforcement.153 As
these courts are concluding, § 1373, though literally written as a
prohibition, operates like a mandate in effect.154 Given these developments,
a state court may see anti-sanctuary prohibitions in the same way.
But even under a narrow view that anti-sanctuary prohibitions are
just that—simply prohibitions and not commandeering—they might still
constitute an interference with the power of local self-government under
home rule. The goal of anti-sanctuary prohibitions is to ensure that linelevel ofcers have the irrevocable discretion, if they so choose, to
participate in federal immigration enforcement.155 But in doing so, state
anti-sanctuary laws severely constrain the ability of local governments to

151. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2018); H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018) (codiﬁed in scattered titles of the Tenn. Code Ann.) (prohibiting
state and local governmental entities and ofcials from adopting sanctuary policies); see
also H.B. 179, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017) (proposing to require “state and
local authorities to cooperate with the federal government in the enforcement of
immigration laws”). Interestingly, all three of these are also home-rule states. See supra
section II.A.
152. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012); supra section I.A.
154. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“The
characterization of Section 1373 as a prohibition that requires no afrmative state
action . . . does not accurately portray its practical import. Section 1373 mandates that
state and city employees have the option of furnishing to the INS information on
individuals’ immigration status while the employee is acting . . . as a state or local
ofcial.”). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478
(2018), courts have entirely rejected the prohibition versus mandate distinction in
explicitly ruling Section 1373 unconstitutional. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 855, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (rejecting the “command-versus-proscription
dichotomy” in assessing Section 1373); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d
289, 329–31 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that by “prohibiting certain conduct of government
entities or ofcials,” Section 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment by “unequivocally
dictat[ing] what a state legislature may and many not do” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478)).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 69–72.
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oversee their workforces, control the use of municipal resources, and
manage their internal administration. These laws efectively isolate local
ofcers from the local governments that employ them. Indeed, antisanctuary prohibitions may afect local personnel management beyond
the immigration enforcement context. Given how broadly state antisanctuary laws are now being written, simply requiring local law
enforcement employees to adhere to the duties for which they are hired—
murder investigation, neighborhood outreach, parking enforcement—
may itself constitute less than full support for immigration enforcement
or an impediment to cooperation with federal authorities.
In short, contrary to what the Fifth Circuit concluded in City of El
Cenizo,156 the power to preempt is not necessarily synonymous with the
power to commandeer. Of course, whether state anticommandeering can
be raised as a home-rule claim is far from settled. We suspect that in
states like Missouri and Ohio,157 where the courts’ interpretation of home
rule echoes the federal anticommandeering doctrine,158 a stronger case
against anti-sanctuary might be made. Yet, in states like Texas, where
home rule is unevenly allocated and there has been no decision
protecting the local government structure of home-rule cities from state
preemption,159 the prospects of such a case are less clear. As a result, the
equivalence that the Fifth Circuit drew in City of El Cenizo between state
preemption and state commandeering in the anti-sanctuary context may
turn out to be the governing rule.160 But reaching that deﬁnitive
conclusion would require a state law challenge that squarely places this
question before a state court.
2. Fiscal Accountability and Unfunded Mandates. — State anti-sanctuary
laws also impose costs in ways that undermine ﬁscal accountability. Local
governments have long complained about unfunded mandates, through
which the state expands local responsibilities but does not provide the
resources to carry them out or authorize a new revenue source to fund
doing so.161 For local ofcials, the concerns involve the need to raise
taxes or redirect resources from other priorities. As a policy matter, the
worry is that unfunded mandates allow states to shirk the need to
internalize the cost of their own policies, thus encouraging them to
adopt inefcient laws that they would not otherwise enact.162
156. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 191 (5th Cir. 2018).
157. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 67.307 (West 2018); H.B. 179, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2017).
158. See supra notes 141–146 and accompanying text.
159. Recall that Texas accords home rule to cities, but not counties. See supra note
134.
160. See City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 191.
161. See Berman, supra note 99, at 29, 32–35.
162. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 1, 35–38 (2004) (stating that “the purchase price undermines Congress’s ability to use
commandeering to externalize the costs of its regulation”).
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Again, ﬁscal accountability has some connections with the federal
anticommandeering doctrine. As the Supreme Court explained, if federal
commandeering were widely permitted, “[m]embers of Congress” would
be able to “take credit for ‘solving’ problems without having to ask their
constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.”163 But at
the state level, the legal backlash against unfunded mandates has taken a
more direct turn. As noted earlier, since the 1970s, more than a dozen
states have adopted constitutional amendments limiting the states’ ability
to impose unfunded mandates.164 The ﬁrst, ratiﬁed by Tennessee in 1978,
states that “[n]o law of general application shall impose increased
expenditure requirements on cities or counties unless the General
Assembly shall provide that the state share in the cost.”165 Subsequent
amendments have gone even further, including New Hampshire’s, which
bars the state from mandating additional programs or responsibilities
“unless such programs or responsibilities are fully funded by the state,”166
and Florida’s, which requires the state to provide funding for state
mandates directly or authorize a new funding source that is capable of
covering the additional costs.167
Federal and state ofcials tend to talk about anti-sanctuary laws as
law enforcement measures.168 But at the local level, they are widely seen
as “unfunded mandates” requiring local ofcials to carry out a federal
responsibility.169 The kinds of activities that state anti-sanctuary laws are
163. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
164. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
165. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24.
166. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 28-a.
167. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18.
168. See Gromer Jefers Jr., Greg Abbot Defends Sanctuary Cities Law at Texas
Sherifs’ Meeting, Dall. Morning News (July 31, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/texas-legislature/2017/07/31/greg-abbott-defends-sanctuary-cities-law-texas-sherifsmeeting (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Texas Governor Abbot’s views that
S.B. 4’s ban against sanctuary cities prevents human trafcking and other crimes); Kevin
Johnson, Sessions Defends Sanctuary Cities Lawsuit Against California, USA Today (Mar. 7,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/07/sessions-defends-sanctuarycities-lawsuit-against-california/402936002/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing then-Attorney General Sessions’s intent to punish California and sanctuary
cities for frustrating federal law enforcement); see also Sanctuary Cities E.O., supra note
47 (explaining that the purpose of the Executive Order is to enforce immigration law and
ensure the security of the country).
169. See, e.g., Ilyse Hogue, Alabama Immigration Law Recalls Darkest Moments in History,
Guardian (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/
oct/18/alabama-immigration-law (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting a county
ofcial describing the state’s anti-sanctuary law as “another unfunded mandate to a county
struggling to keep its head above water”); Yucel Ors, Federal Government Should Fix the
Immigration System, Not Cities, Nat’l League of Cities (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nlc.org/
article/federal-government-should-fix-the-immigration-system-not-cities [https://perma.cc/
J8ZB-P7TY] (“NLC’s long-standing position is that measures requiring cities to use local
law enforcement resources to enforce federal immigration laws are unfunded mandates
that impose additional disproportionate responsibilities on local law enforcement, increase

866

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:837

now mandating are expensive. Localities incur direct costs when they
comply with federal detainer requests that are uncompensated by both
the federal government making the request and by the state mandating
compliance with the federal request.170 They also redirect manpower
from other law enforcement priorities, such as when local police ofcers
are allocated to immigration enforcement task forces at the request of
the federal government.171
In enacting anti-sanctuary legislation, states routinely tout the importance of local participation to the interest and welfare of the state.172
But none of the anti-sanctuary laws provide state funds to cover their
open-ended mandates. S.B. 4 in Texas comes closest—by establishing a
competitive grant program that cities can apply for and by agreeing to
use state funds to indemnify localities for any liability incurred because of
constitutional violations associated with federal detainer requests.173 Yet
even there, the state makes no attempt to cover all or even a meaningful
proportion of the costs associated with local immigration enforcement.
Outsourcing like this seems to be precisely the kind of legislative
distortion that state prohibitions on unfunded mandates were intended
to cover, notwithstanding the creative ways that legislatures attempt to
write around those constraints. Florida’s proposed law, for example,
authorizes localities to seek reimbursement from the federal government
and the detainees themselves.174 But there is little to suggest that these
“revenue sources” are likely to “generate the amount of funds estimated
to be sufcient to fund [the mandated] expenditure,” as the state

financial liability on local governments, and ultimately move us further from our foundational
principles of federalism.”).
170. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510–11 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(noting that the federal government neither reimburses local governments when they
comply with detainer requests nor indemniﬁes them for liability incurred because of
Fourth Amendment violations); Cty. of Santa Clara, Civil Immigration Detainer Requests Board Policy 3.54, at 1 (2011), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/scc/gov/CountyPolicies/
Board-Policy-3.54-Civil-Immigration-Detainer-Requests.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MJJ-X8CF]
(requiring federal reimbursement of all costs before the County complies with ICE
detainer requests); Cty. of Santa Clara, Summary of Proceedings/Minutes of Board of
Supervisors Meeting, Oct. 18, 2011, at 4 (2011), http://sccgov.iqm2.com/Citizens/
FileOpen.aspx?Type=12&ID=1135&Inline=True [https://perma.cc/LL4D-M5E5] (noting
that detainers are unlikely to be honored if dependent on federal reimbursement).
171. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1087 (2004) (explaining that local enforcement of immigration
law has been critiqued for “divert[ing] resources from local policing priorities”).
172. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-59-101 (2018) (“Because the matters contained in
this chapter have important statewide ramiﬁcations for compliance with and enforcement
of federal immigration laws and for the welfare of all citizens in this state, these matters
are of statewide concern.”).
173. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 402.0241 (2017); S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017)
(codiﬁed at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.055).
174. See H.B. 9, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
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constitution requires.175 Tennessee perhaps seeks to avoid the unfundedmandate problem altogether by prohibiting sanctuary policies but does
not impose any speciﬁc mandates to participate in federal immigration
enforcement.176 But given our discussion about how sanctuary
prohibitions like the one in Tennessee operate as implicit mandates in
practice,177 a court might be convinced to reject such an efort to
circumvent the state’s unfunded mandate provision.
Even in states without an explicit ban on unfunded mandates,
accountability concerns loom large. One wonders whether states would
be as eager as they are to enact anti-sanctuary legislation if they had to
fund the additional costs themselves through state revenues—or if the
practical efect of anti-sanctuary legislation is better understood as not
only a conscription of local ofcials but also a conscription of local
cofers. After all, courts have long recognized in the context of home
rule that there is no “greater municipal concern than how a city’s tax
dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less interest to
taxpayers of other jurisdictions.”178
3. Local Democracy. — Finally, state anti-sanctuary laws threaten the
long-standing fundamentals of American-style local democracy. The
threat here is not simply that states are repealing local sanctuary policies.
Rather, it is that the speciﬁc manner in which anti-sanctuary laws seek to
compel local participation in federal immigration enforcement increasingly
impinges upon democratic discourse, local political representation, and
local legislative agenda setting. This, in turn, may subject certain state antisanctuary laws to claims based specifically on state constitutional
guarantees of local representative democracy.
Indeed, what is striking about the most recent wave of state antisanctuary legislation is the extent to which it targets political speech,
especially those laws that express dissenting views from the state legislature
or executive authority.179 S.B. 4 in Texas prohibits local officials from
“endors[ing]” a policy that “prohibits or materially limits the enforcement
of immigration laws,” in addition to prohibiting the adoption or
enforcement of such a policy.180 In Iowa, local officials are now prohibited
175. Fla. Const. art. VII, § 18.
176. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 24 (“No law of general application shall impose
increased expenditure requirements on cities or counties unless the General Assembly
shall provide that the state share in the cost.”).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 152–154.
178. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 1002 (Cal. 1992).
179. The state attorney general is often tasked with prosecuting violations of state antisanctuary laws. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.055 (2017) (“[The state] attorney general
may ﬁle a petition for a writ of mandamus or apply for other appropriate equitable
relief . . . to compel the entity or department that is suspected of violating Section
752.053[’s immigration enforcement law] to comply with that section.”).
180. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(a)(1)).
As the district court noted in City of El Cenizo, the author of S.B. 4 suggested that “a ‘wink, wink’
or a nod could be construed as an endorsement,” as could “simply standing in support of a
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from undertaking “any . . . action” that “discourages the enforcement of
immigration laws.”181 A Florida bill, which ultimately died in the State
Senate, sought to punish local ofcials with suspension or removal from
ofce for voting either for a local sanctuary policy or against its repeal—
even if such a vote would have been purely expressive in nature and
would not actually have led to the implementation of a sanctuary
policy.182
Understandably, these states are trying to preclude any efort by
localities to circumvent their anti-sanctuary legislation. But in doing so,
they go beyond the local sanctuary policies themselves. They target the
views of local ofcials and attempt to foreclose the various means by
which those views might be expressed.
The personal nature of the penalties for violating state anti-sanctuary
laws adds another layer to this attack on local democratic discourse. We
ordinarily believe that local ofcials are elected to give voice to the views
of their constituents and act upon them if possible. But by targeting local
ofcials personally, the contemporary wave of state anti-sanctuary laws
threatens to undermine this traditional connection between local officials
and the people they are elected to represent. A city council member may,
for example, refuse to speak out against a state’s immigration mandate not
because that reflects the views of her constituents but because she fears her
removal from office or other personal sanctions. This reluctance may
serve the interest of the state, which seeks to ensure that only its view is
expressed. The result, however, is to undermine the traditional role of
local ofcials as democratic representatives of their constituents in
enacting legislation and political advocacy.
Moreover, the broad and punitive scope of contemporary antisanctuary laws may even have an efect on local policy agendas outside of
the immigration context, like an inclusive zoning policy that makes
afordable housing available to city residents irrespective of immigration
status. The issue is not whether a court will eventually hold that such a
policy “materially limits the enforcement of immigration law,” as
prohibited by anti-sanctuary laws like S.B. 4.183 It is whether local

group such as MALDEF or LULAC when that group is making a public statement against
[S.B.] 4 or in support of the type of local policies that it bans.” City of El Cenizo v. Texas,
264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 781 (W.D. Tex. 2017). The State argued that the “endorse” language
should be interpreted narrowly to mean “sanction” and be limited to ofcial speech. See
City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 182 (5th Cir. 2018). But whether the state
intended to exercise its discretion in that manner does not change the fact that the state
legislature included the word “endorse” alongside and in addition to “adopt” and
“enforce.”
181. S. F. 481, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018) (to be codiﬁed at Iowa Code
§ 825.4).
182. See H.B. 9, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 908.303(4) (Fla. 2018).
183. Tex. S.B. 4.
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policymakers—regardless of their beliefs on sanctuary—would be willing
to take the risk.
There are some signs that these democratic concerns are being
addressed in federal anti-sanctuary litigation. As noted earlier, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the district court’s injunction against the “endorsement”
ban in S.B. 4, at least with respect to elected ofcials.184 Nevertheless, it is
telling that the reason elected ofcials are protected is not any immunity
they might enjoy as democratic representatives but rather their First
Amendment right to free speech in their private capacity.185 The efect
here is to protect local representatives engaged in democratic discourse
and debate. But given the framing of the underlying federal litigation,
and the court’s reluctance to separate the locality from the state in its
federal constitutional analysis,186 the efect of Texas’s law on local
democracy is understood as irrelevant.
In comparison, a challenge founded speciﬁcally on localism
arguments may prove just as efective and more to the point. Indeed, as
punitive preemption statutes have become more popular, there have
already been some eforts to translate these democratic concerns into
concrete localism claims. In Florida Carry, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, for
example, the city, joined by several amici, challenged a Florida law that
subjects local ofcials to personal ﬁnes and removal from ofce for their
vote on gun-related measures as an unconstitutional extension of the
state’s traditional powers of preemption.187 They argued that the personalsanctions provision violates the legislative immunity of local representatives
and that such immunity is an “inherent component of the constitutional
guarantee of local representative democracy” contained in the Florida
constitution.188 The district court chose not to address the city’s local184. City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 184–85.
185. See id.
186. Indeed, this is why the court refused to extend the “endorsement” injunction to
nonelected ofcials. Although the court found that the issue was not properly before it, it
noted that the speech of nonelected ofcials would likely be governed by the government
speech doctrine, which in this case would mean that the state can compel such local
ofcials to speak in a particular way because they are simply mouthpieces of the state. Id.
The Fifth Circuit did not make the same distinction that the district court did in arguing
that the local ofcials targeted by S.B. 4 are not state employees but rather elected local
ofcials. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744, 779 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
187. No. 2014-CA-1168, 2015 WL 13612020, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2015), af’d, 212
So. 3d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
188. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Florida League of Cities, in Support of Appellees/CrossAppellants at 4, Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d 452 (No. 1D15-5520), http://defendlocal.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/LeagueOfCitiesAmicus.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAD3-UAYF]; see also
Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief at 11–12, Florida Carry, Inc., No.
2014-CA-1168, 2014 WL 12740968; Brief of the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Cross-Appellants at 13–14, Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d
452 (No. 1D15-5520), http://lawcenter.gifords.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/201605-16-Florida-Carry-v.-City-of-Tallahassee-Law-Center-Amicus-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VVZ25BR].
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democracy claim, ﬁnding that the individual defendants were not subject
to the sanction provisions and thus did not present a case or controversy
with respect to that claim.189 But the city’s argument in Florida Carry
suggests that there is more at stake when it comes to personal sanctions
against legislative activities than the free speech rights of local ofcials in
their private capacities.
C.

Addressing the Limits of Localism

Thus far, we have argued that localism provides not only an important
doctrinal lens for assessing state anti-sanctuary laws but also legal claims
that might be used to counter their expansion and proliferation. We
admit, however, that the conventional view is far more pessimistic about
localism’s prospects, especially in the context of immigration. It is
commonly assumed that localities, as “creatures” of the state, remain
uniquely vulnerable to state preemption despite the many ways in which
local autonomy has expanded.190 At the same time, because immigration
is widely believed to be a national issue, it is difcult for many to see how
a given local sanctuary policy might be considered a “local afair,” and
thus within the sphere of authority in which local power is presumed to
be strongest in relation to the state.191 We address these and other
concerns here. Notably, we do so by highlighting the unique structure of
state anti-sanctuary laws and how it difers from not only the structure of
other state preemption statutes but also that of traditional immigration
regulations more generally.
As an initial matter, standard state preemption analysis is likely not
the right framework for assessing state anti-sanctuary laws. Traditionally,
when a state preempts, it replaces a local regulation with a state regulation;
the goal is to mandate a uniform set of laws with respect to how private
activity is regulated and what kind of individual rights are recognized.
This is what states have done in repealing local legislation on economic
rights (minimum wage and paid family leave), civil rights (antidiscrimination for members of the LGBTQ community), and environmental
policies (fracking and plastic bags).192 But while state anti-sanctuary laws
tend to be discussed today as part of this broader state preemption
wave,193 they are unique insofar as they seek to compel speciﬁc local
189. Florida Carry, Inc., 2015 WL 13612020, at *6. The Florida District Court of Appeals
afrmed the district court’s ﬁnding on this score. Florida Carry, Inc., 212 So. 3d at 466.
190. See supra section I.C.
191. See Su, The States of Immigration, supra note 43, at 1372 (describing how
focusing on public beneﬁts and the ﬁscal cost of immigration could provide a lens
through which “immigration could be sensibly understood as a matter of ‘states’ rights’”).
192. See, e.g., Brifault, New Preemption, supra note 20, at 1999–2002 (collecting
examples of these and other areas of state preemption).
193. See id. at 2004–05 (citing anti-sanctuary legislation in Florida, Texas, and Arizona
as examples of eforts to impose penalties on local governments for adopting laws subject
to preemption).
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governmental action, as opposed to simply displacing local regulations of
residents and businesses.
In the federalism context, the Supreme Court draws precisely this
distinction in holding that the federal government’s power to preempt
state legislation by regulating citizens directly does not encompass the
power to commandeer the states.194 Now, it may be that many states,
including those with broad home-rule protections, do allow for state
commandeering. But as we showed, whether the state can assume direct
control of local ofcials is separate from whether it can preempt local
laws or policies. The fact is, unlike general preemption, few state courts
have directly addressed this issue as a matter of local–state relations,
largely because there have been few state laws in recent history that aim
to do what state anti-sanctuary laws are now attempting.
Second, even if one believes immigration enforcement is a uniquely
national issue that should be immune from local interference,195 such an
understanding does nothing to resolve the issue of whether states should
have special preeminence over localities in immigration matters. To be
sure, local sanctuary policies may now be a central issue in the national
debate over immigration. Moreover, a court might reason that because
states rank higher in the federal hierarchy than localities, immigration is
properly regarded as a statewide issue.196 But under the plenary power
doctrine, states should have no more standing with respect to immigration
than localities. And unlike local immigration regulations, sanctuary
policies are largely eforts by localities to remain in their traditional
sphere of local authority and distance themselves from the exclusive

194. See, e.g., Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476–77 (2018); see also supra note
53 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 604 (1889) (“While under our constitution and form of government the great mass of
local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States . . . are one nation,
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be
invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security . . . .”).
196. Indeed, this sentiment appears to have contributed to a curious decision by the
California Supreme Court in the early twentieth century. In City of Pasadena v. Charleville, the
court was faced with the issues of whether a home rule city could (1) require a contractor on
a public-works project to pay the prevailing wage and (2) allow that contractor to hire
noncitizens, both of which were prohibited by state law. 10 P.2d 745, 746 (Cal. 1932). The
resulting split decision illustrates the conceptual distortion of immigration. With respect to
the prevailing-wage requirement, the court held that no issue was more local than how a city
decides to spend its own money. Thus, under the home-rule immunity granted by the
California Constitution, state law must give way to local discretion. Presumably the same
reasoning should apply to the city’s decision to use its own money to hire contractors that
employed immigrants. But here, the court abruptly reversed course. In seeming
contradiction with its earlier statements, the court argued here that “[a]ll public works and
all public property in the state in a broad sense belong to all of the people of the state” and
thus are statewide concerns, even when the public property in question is owned by a homerule city. Id. at 750. Thus, unlike the prevailing-wage requirement, the employment of
noncitizens on public works is not a local matter and is subject to preemption by state law.
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federal responsibility over immigration enforcement. These policies are
often enacted in response to uniquely local concerns: trust between
police and residents, the efficient allocation of scarce municipal resources,
and the need to clearly deﬁne the roles and responsibilities of local
ofcials.197 Again, a state court may ﬁnd some distinctive state interest
that outweighs the local concerns at stake with respect to sanctuary. But
in our view, that is also a localism consideration separate from the legal
view that immigration, as a whole, is a national issue.
Third, the fact that localism claims in general—and speciﬁc claims
like those suggested above—tend to be untested and undeveloped
should be reasons for considering rather than dismissing them.
Localities’ historical turn to federal constitutional claims makes sense:
Such arguments have a proven track record on immigration matters, and
federal courts have largely been receptive to their use to oppose federal
anti-sanctuary policies.198 But because state anti-sanctuary laws are
shifting the legal terrain for battles over local sanctuary policies, there is
arguably no better time to begin cultivating localism claims as an
alternative. Indeed, if the result from the Texas S.B. 4 litigation is any
indication, pressing immigration localism arguments might be necessary.
Finally, just as cities draw upon legal victories by other cities in
bolstering their own litigation eforts against federal anti-sanctuary
policies, a successful localism claim in one state might support legal
challenges elsewhere. Despite the diferences in localism structure from
state to state, there are also many commonalities around which an
interlocal litigation strategy can be built. Given the fact that localities
today are facing state-level regulation on a host of policy matters,
immigration localism claims can bolster the move to protect local
policymaking more generally.
All of this suggests the need to take localism seriously in confronting
state anti-sanctuary laws. Even if Congress were to pass a law granting
localities the discretion to choose whether and to what extent they wish
to participate in federal immigration enforcement,199 it is unclear that
such a law could insulate localities from state laws mandating their
involvement. Given that localities draw all their power and authority from
197. See, e.g., Gurbir S. Grewal, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Law Enforcement
Directive No. 2018-6, at 1 (2018), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/
ag-directive-2018-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VTP-9BXH] (explaining that the state’s new
directive clariﬁes the role of state law enforcement ofcers in enforcing “state criminal law”
and not “federal civil immigration law”).
198. See supra section I.A (examining local governments’ successful litigation against
the federal government’s anti-sanctuary policies).
199. In the litigation against S.B. 4 in Texas, this was precisely the construction that
supporters of local sanctuary policies sought to apply to existing federal law—namely
section 287(g). See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 180 (5th Cir. 2018). Ironically,
it is also what supporters of 287(g) agreements might have argued against the provision of
California’s S.B. 54 (the “state sanctuary law”) that prohibits localities from entering into
287(g) agreements. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(F)–(G) (2018).
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the state, it is doubtful that the federal government could directly grant
localities discretion, or otherwise interfere with how states regulate that
discretion, without running afoul of the federal anticommandeering
doctrine or state sovereignty principles more generally.200 What this
means is that unless the federal government is willing to deny all state
and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement—an
extremely unlikely scenario—cities and localities cannot depend on the
federal government to protect local sanctuary policies from state laws
through federal preemption. At some point, if states persist in pursuing
anti-sanctuary policies, localities must turn to their own legal standing
and the localism structure of their state.
III. THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF IMMIGRATION LOCALISM
Even if a move toward considering local autonomy might be
necessitated by contemporary state anti-sanctuary laws, fully embracing a
localist stance means asking whether that litigation game is worth the
candle. This Part argues that it is and guardedly advances the normative case
for immigration localism, at least as it pertains to participation in the
federal enforcement regime.
Section III.A below argues that a localist reorientation of immigration
enforcement offers a better way to think about immigration policymaking
and enforcement today. Defending sanctuary cities qua cities renders a
more accurate description of the enforcement regime, allowing for
immigration law theory to more fully account for the statutory and
practical importance of municipal governments, local agencies, and city
ofcials. In addition, acknowledging the signiﬁcance of municipal
empowerment on immigration facilitates the opportunity for local civic
participation by communities to more efectively engage and inﬂuence
the national discourse on immigration policy.

200. The Supreme Court touched on some of these concerns in Nixon v. Missouri
Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 129 (2004). The Court held that in enacting a law protecting
the ability of “any entity” to provide telecommunication services from state restrictions,
Congress did not intend to cover municipal governments like cities. Id. at 128–29. To
support this ﬁnding, the Court documented the ways in which federal preemption would
operate diferently depending on whether prior authorization to provide
telecommunication services like municipal broadband had been granted to localities by
the state. See id. at 134–38. Noting the difculty of achieving uniformity, Justice Souter
concluded that “preempting state or local governmental self-regulation (or regulation of
political inferiors) would work so diferently from preempting regulation of private players
that we think it highly unlikely that Congress intended to set of on such uncertain
adventures.” Id. at 134. Nowhere did the Court suggest that federal law might create
uniformity by empowering localities directly. But see Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch.
Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 261 (1985) (holding that a federal law providing for federal
payments to a county that can be used for “‘any’ governmental purpose” preempted a
state law specifying their particular use, but not discussing localism or anticommandeering
concerns).
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Yet, as we acknowledge in section III.B, localism is perilous as well.
As Nestor Davidson argues in a recent essay, although localism might
serve many progressive ends, it can also be used as a tool of exclusion,
with local resources marshaled toward reinforcing social and economic
inequalities.201 This is evident with respect to how immigrants fare in
local communities more generally,202 and it might also be the case for
immigration enforcement. We consider two such risks that might worry
immigrant advocates and other progressives on immigration enforcement
issues: Immigration localism (1) might encourage the expansion of local
anti-immigrant policies and (2) might undermine state sanctuary eforts
by providing legal heft to the defense of anti-sanctuary cities. Both are
worrying possibilities; however, localism, on the balance, will better serve
immigrant interests in the long run.
A.

The Promise of Immigration Localism

Localism advances at least two normatively desirable ends. First,
focusing on the city qua city produces a better descriptive account of how
the current immigration enforcement regime operates. In so doing, it
decentralizes the role the federal government has played in immigration
theory and doctrine. Second, immigration localism promotes civic
participation and engagement on immigration enforcement by allowing
local communities to calibrate that enforcement through the democratic
process.
1. Localism as a Descriptive and Theoretical Account. — A focus on local
authority provides courts and policymakers with a more accurate
accounting of what is actually at stake in the current ﬁghts over sanctuary
and highlights the decentralized nature of the immigration enforcement
regime on the ground. Indeed, localism may be precisely the kind of
theoretical framework that we need today, not only to think through the
current state of immigration regulations but also to wean us from an
oversized judicial and theoretical reliance on federal sovereignty as the
cornerstone of immigration law.
While immigration is a pressing national issue, turning our legal
gaze toward localism calls attention to the role of local governments in
our enforcement system, a role that is increasingly prominent in the
construction and execution of federal enforcement policies. In recent
decades, federal immigration enforcement has become more and more
201. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 977.
202. See Rick Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, 47 Hous. L. Rev.
367, 370 (2010) [hereinafter Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation]
(“[T]he legal structure responsible for the fragmentation of our lived environment into
segregated neighborhoods and diferentiated communities can be understood as a
second-order immigration regulation.”); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration Federalism 81 (2015) (showing that smaller-size
cities are more likely to propose or pass restrictionist immigration laws than more
populous cities).
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local.203 Enforcement activities once largely limited to the borders are
now pervasive in the country’s interior.204 Regulations that once centered
on criteria for admission and removal are increasingly intertwined with
traditional spheres of state and local control, including employment,205
housing,206 and social services.207
Anti-sanctuary proponents often complain that cities and other
localities are intruding upon the federal government’s plenary power
over immigration in refusing to comply with federal policy on immigration
enforcement. Yet the increased local influence on immigration has
evolved precisely because federal immigration enforcement has become
reliant on local participation. Since the early 2000s, nearly all federal
enforcement innovations have revolved around a direct federal–local
connection, in most cases bypassing the state entirely.208 The Secure
Communities Program leverages noncitizens’ interactions with local
police ofcers;209 detainer notices and hold requests are sent directly
from federal ofcials to local sherifs’ departments;210 jail-access policies
for ICE are negotiated directly with city- and county-level ofcials;211 and

203. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1819,
1850–52 (2011) (discussing ways in which state and local governments have increasingly
enforced immigration law).
204. As just one example, consider the expansion of expedited removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012). Once limited to aliens arriving at a land border, executive and
administrative rule changes over the past two decades have steadily increased its
application to noncitizens found within 100 miles of the land border, then to within 100
miles of both land and maritime borders, and now to possibly anywhere in the country.
See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01 (Aug. 11, 2004).
205. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012) (obligating employers to check work eligibility of
employees, and penalizing employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers); 8
C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2019) (setting forth classes of noncitizens that are eligible for
employment in the United States).
206. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1436a(a)(1) (2012) (providing housing assistance to
noncitizens who are legal permanent residents).
207. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (deﬁning who constitutes a “qualiﬁed alien” for purposes
of eligibility for certain federal, state, and local public beneﬁts).
208. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB
1070, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1749, 1787–88 (2011) (discussing the federal–local immigration
relationship).
209. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Secure Communities: A Comprehensive
Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens 1 (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3ZK-WW6W]
(explaining the expanded federal–local relationship in enforcing immigration law).
210. See Lasch et al., supra note 21, at 1733–34 (discussing detainer requests that the
federal government sends to local ofcials).
211. See e.g., Brenda Gazzar, Less Cooperation with ICE? LA County’s Sheriff Oversight
Panel Is Considering It, L.A. Daily News (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.dailynews.com/2018/
01/25/la-county-sheriff-overpanel-wants-your-input-on-curbing-cooperation-with-ice/ [https://
perma.cc/T5YJ-PQHU] (explaining that local leaders are deciding whether to limit ICE’s access
to county jails).
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section 287(g) agreements are mostly signed between municipal entities
and the federal government.212
In turn, as a practical matter, this entanglement between federal and
local spheres provides local ofcials with more inﬂuence over how
federal enforcement is carried out.213 The federal government and a
growing number of states now criticize sanctuary localities for obstructing
federal immigration enforcement.214 But the goal of these attacks, both
legal and political, is not to force localities to get out of the way so that
federal agents can work unimpeded. Rather, it is to compel their
participation, so that the federal enforcement regime can operate more
cheaply and aggressively. Indeed, the federal government’s legal argument
as to why state and local sanctuary policies must be voided rests on a
background expectation of local participation in immigration
enforcement.215 As such, any theory of immigration law that relies only on
the talismanic invocation of federal or state sovereign status ignores the
underlying dependence of the immigration enforcement structure on
local governments, resources, and personnel. Advancing localist arguments,
then, helps foreground this reality, forcing courts, the federal
government, and anti-sanctuary states to forthrightly acknowledge and
account for this on-the-ground reality.
Recognizing the integration of localities into core immigration
enforcement functions necessarily forces a concomitant decentralization
of the federal government’s role in dictating immigration rules. As one
of the authors of this Essay and others have argued in prior work, one of
the cornerstones of “immigration exceptionalism” has been the
categorical power accorded immigration actions by the federal
government, both from Congress and the executive.216 The federal
courts’ reliance on a broad federal power over immigration policy has
immunized explicitly discriminatory immigration policies, and
enforcement tactics, from searching judicial review.217 The current debate
212. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (explaining section 287(g) agreements between the federal
and municipal governments).
213. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
Yale L.J. 1256, 1265–71 (2009) (discussing the “power of the servant” to inﬂuence federal
policy).
214. See supra Part I (discussing federal and state governments’ criticism of sanctuary
cities’ resistance to federal immigration enforcement).
215. See Sanctuary Cities E.O., supra note 47, § 8 (describing the level of state and
local participation needed in order for the federal government to have an efective
immigration enforcement policy).
216. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 21, at 594–99.
217. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2423 (2018) (holding that the INA
“exudes deference to the President in every clause” and thus would allow the suspension
of entry for people from certain countries without contravening the Establishment
Clause); United States ex rel. Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“At the
outset we wish to point out that an alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so
under any claim of right. . . . Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as
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over state anti-sanctuary laws focuses on similar attributes of sovereignty,
with the constitutional recognition of plenary state authority over
localities quashing dissent over immigration enforcement at the
municipal level.
Accordingly, as localism shifts judicial and public focus to the nowindispensable role of local agencies and agents in immigration enforcement,
it contributes to a general de-emphasis on the role that constitutionally
recognized sovereign status should play in immigration regulation.
Although we concede that the federal government is now, will likely
always be, and perhaps should be a powerful voice in setting immigration
policy, this Essay’s defense of local autonomy is part of a larger
theoretical move toward recalibrating that centralized authority. In prior
work, two of us have noted that the proliferation of nongovernmental
sanctuaries, in the form of universities, workplaces, religious organizations,
and community groups, is already exerting pressure on that conventional
view—repeated almost reﬂexively in judicial opinions and litigation
briefs—that immigration enforcement is a purely federal concern.218
At times, judicial and political emphasis on an outsized role for the
central government is justiﬁed by the alleged need for “uniformity” in
immigration law.219 Even if uniformity in immigration enforcement is
prized, however, it is worth asking whether it can be achieved once
thousands of localities, enforcement agencies, and ofcers are made
integral parts of that system. At the very least, it has to be acknowledged
that a desire for uniformity is in tension with a desire to implement
immigration enforcement by conscripting and cajoling hundreds of
unconnected agencies and ofcials, outside of DHS control, each
answering to diferent constituencies, none of which were created for the
purpose of immigration enforcement. The greater the reliance on this
set of decentralized and semiautonomous actors, the less the probability
of achieving uniformity. Thus, the very idea of uniformity as a
jurisprudential conceit is in tension with the structure and practice of
federal immigration enforcement law, which has actively sought to rely
on localities to achieve its enforcement vision.
A localist reorientation of immigration enforcement, then, creates
space for recognition of, and emphasis on, the intricate relationships
the United States shall prescribe.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603–06 (1889) (holding the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
constitutional under the federal government’s broad powers to secure the nation against
insurrection).
218. See Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 25, at 1232–38,
1242–49; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Opinion, The Case for NonGovernmental Sanctuary, L.A. Times (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-gulasekaram-villazor-immigrant-sanctuary-network-20180405-story.html [https://perma.cc/
9YXY-NZDZ].
219. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 548–49
(5th Cir. 2013) (noting cases that discussed the need for uniformity in immigration law
enforcement).
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between the federal enforcement scheme and local officers and
institutions. This reorientation also allows judicial consideration of why
local opinions matter. Once localities are made indispensable partners in
the enforcement regime, any drive towards uniformity must be balanced
against the tradeofs inherent in genuine, uncoerced participation by
local constituencies.
Even if the federal government and anti-sanctuary states have the
legal authority to displace local discretion, translating that authority into
practice remains difcult. Anti-sanctuary laws can go only so far to
compel assistance, much less enthusiastic participation. Local elected
ofcials have little incentive to carry out state or federal policies that are
unpopular among their constituents. Moreover, the administrative
independence of local governments means that neither the state nor
federal government is well situated to ensure compliance through
monitoring. These limitations are likely why the trend among state antisanctuary laws has been to increase penalties and target informal norms.
But as scholars of intergovernmental relations often observe,
negotiations and partnerships are often more efective than censure and
sanctions in recruiting meaningful assistance.220 Acknowledging the role
of local governments, and engaging with them as potential partners, may
ultimately be the most effective way to carry out immigration enforcement.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that sanctuary city policies
have generally not withheld all local assistance. They often allow for local
immigration enforcement in circumstances where local interests
converge with those of federal authorities. Chicago, for example, has
zealously defended its sanctuary policy against the federal government,
even scoring major victories that threaten to undermine federal antisanctuary eforts far into the future.221 But Chicago’s sanctuary policy
exempts many individual cases, such as when an individual has an
outstanding criminal warrant, has been charged with or convicted of a
felony, or has been identiﬁed as a gang member.222 In fact, some counties
that now refuse to honor immigration detainers do not consider
themselves opponents of federal immigration enforcement. Rather, their
concern is with the refusal of the federal government to compensate
them for the cost that they are being asked to incur or to indemnify them
for the mistakes that the federal government makes. These examples
reveal that there is room for negotiation and finding common interest.
220. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, How to Conduct Efective Transnational Negotiations
Between Nations, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Business Firms, 45 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y 69, 75–76 (2014) (suggesting that distrustful nations employ “conﬁdence building”
measures to restore mutual trust and move toward more overarching commitments);
Karen Tokarz & Leila Nadya Sadat, Introduction, 45 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 1, 2 (2014)
(“Alternative Dispute Resolution . . . has emerged as a principle mode of legal practice in
virtually every legal ﬁeld in virtually every country in the world.”).
221. See supra section I.A.
222. Chi., Ill., Mun. Code § 2-173-042(c) (2018).
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Tilting our legal and theoretical gaze toward localism begins to allow for
these negotiations and calibrations instead of the all-or-nothing stakes of
either federal plenary power or state-centered federalism.
2. The Role of Local Civic Engagement in Immigration Discourse. —
Localism also calls attention to the democratic process through which
sanctuary and other immigration-related policies are made. While it
might also be true that localism supports certain types of decisions (that
is, integrationist over restrictionist policies), that is not our point here.
Rather, it is that there may be some qualitative diferences in how policies
are made at the local level—tailored, personal, accessible—that are worth
defending on their own, even in the context of immigration. More
broadly, local decisionmaking on immigration enforcement allows
communities to more efficiently and effectively participate in the national
discourse over immigration. Even if only Congress and the President
retain authority over large questions of admissions, removals, and visa
allocations, local engagement on enforcement at the agency, city, and
county levels provides an accessible democratic vehicle for community
residents to express their approval or disapproval of those national
policies.
Somewhat ironically, both the federal government and the states
rationalize anti-sanctuary and other interior enforcement strategies as
beneﬁcial to the local communities that they are targeting. They argue
that zealous immigration enforcement makes communities safer and
promotes the economic well-being of their residents.223 To the extent
that any of these community-well-being-minded claims are in fact
genuine,224 they raise the question of who is in the best position to make
that decision—the communities themselves or state and federal governments. It is, after all, local cofers that will likely have to bear the
personnel and facilities costs of choosing to aid in enforcement. And if,
in fact, sanctuary policies lead to increased crime and public safety
threats, we might presume that local constituencies would be inclined to
reject them or at least temper their noncooperation stances.
To the extent national decisionmaking on immigration focuses on
diferent concerns than does local policymaking, only localism provides a
conceptual and political space for those considerations. National
debates, by necessity, rely on aggregate statistics or generalized anecdotes
to present competing narratives about the efect of immigration on the
223. See, e.g., Marie Solis, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities are ‘Crime-Infested’—Research
Suggests He’s Wrong, Newsweek (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-sayssanctuary-cities-are-crime-infested-research-shows-hes-wrong-891827 [https://perma.cc/3M6LKVZL].
224. See Tom K. Wong, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The Efects of Sanctuary Policies on
Crime and the Economy 14 (2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/
Effects-Sanctuary-Policies-Crime-and-Economy-2017-01-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS7Q-TZ26]
(contradicting the Trump Administration’s repeated claim that sanctuary city policies lead to
crime and violence).
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country. These broad narratives form the basis for the partisan divide
that deﬁnes immigration negotiations at the federal level. When the scale
is reduced, however, the details and diversity of immigration’s impacts on
diferent communities are revealed. In some instances, the efect of
particular immigrant groups on discrete industries in speciﬁc
communities forms the basis for decisionmaking.225
It is also almost certainly true that at the local level, immigrants are
less likely to be defined entirely by their legal status under federal
immigration law.226 Instead, they are more likely to be known as
neighbors, colleagues, schoolmates, friends.227 Human interactions at the
community level, of course, do not necessarily generate good
impressions. Local controversy over immigration is as much spurred by
“unneighborly” conduct—overcrowded houses, unkempt lawns, loud
music—as concern about the security of our national borders.228 But it is
also through these personal interactions that the divide between
immigrant and native, old-timers and newcomers is bridged.
We may celebrate the cosmopolitan culture in American cities for its
tolerance and acceptance of immigrants. But this culture did not arise
fully formed with the establishment of these cities; rather, it reﬂects a
long, tortured, and ongoing process by which diferent groups of
people—immigrant and otherwise—have interacted with one another at
the neighborhood level. Even if smaller towns are more likely to be
inhospitable to foreigners, and thus favor immigration enforcement at
the national level, they are also often just as quick to rally against such
enforcement when federal authorities come not for nameless “illegals”
225. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 202, at 73–82 (showing that
although GOP-majority localities are much more likely to enact restrictionist measures, the
existence of large agricultural business interests in GOP-controlled areas is a consistent
factor in disincentivizing the proposal, or defeating the enactment, of restrictionist local
laws).
226. Cf. Megan Brenan, Record-High 75% of Americans Say Immigration Is Good
Thing, Gallup (June 21, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235793/record-highamericans-say-immigration-good-thing.aspx [https://perma.cc/3QVF-ZFR2] (“A recordhigh 75% of Americans, including majorities of all party groups, think immigration is a
good thing for the U.S.—up slightly from 71% last year. Just 19% of the public considers
immigration a bad thing.”).
227. Cf. Nina Shapiro, A Washington County that Went for Trump Is Shaken as Immigrant
Neighbors Start Disappearing, Seattle Times (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/
seattle-news/northwest/fear-regrets-as-pacific-county-residents-go-missing-amid-immigrationcrackdown-police-chief-neighbors-kind-of-in-shock-after-immigration-arrests-in-pacific-countyimmigration-crack/ [https://perma.cc/AVK6-RYR3] (describing a small Washington town
where the conservative police chief lamented “neighbors just snatched” from their midst).
228. See, e.g., Thomas J. Vicino, Suburban Crossroads: The Fight for Local Control of
Immigration Policy 68–69, 73–74 (2012) (describing the town of Farmers Branch, whose
city council targeted immigration policy as a reason for the small community’s continued
decline); Su, Local Fragmentation as Immigration Regulation, supra note 202, at 368–69,
423–34 (“The intimate, local context where the efect of immigration is the most
immediate and transparent . . . not only informs, but profoundly shapes how the issue and
regulation of immigration is perceived.”).
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but rather for Carlos,229 or Armando,230 or Marcos231—residents and
members of their community. If national politics is about what happens to
those people “out there,” local politics opens the opportunity to consider
how policies afect those who are “here.”
The inevitability of interaction between nationals and immigrants
at the local level makes localities potential sites of immigrant integration.232
Local spaces and institutions—schools, parks, agencies, neighborhoods—
are where all residents, regardless of immigration status, encounter each
other on a face-to-face basis. By necessity, noncitizens and citizens must
mobilize and determine municipal policies. This dynamic, of course, is
not new. Since the earliest waves of immigration, the political assimilation
of immigrants in America has started at the local level. Immigrants were
an integral part of the urban political machines that dominated local
politics in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, through which they secured
middle-class jobs in city government and eventually became leading
ﬁgures in party politics. If the Irish of the nineteenth century ultimately
fared better than the Chinese, it was in part because the Chinese were
unable to naturalize, which foreclosed them from exercising political
power even if they were able to efectively litigate against the laws
targeting them. In the same vein, the partisan backlash against
immigrants today also appears to be fueled less by the actual numbers of
immigrants arriving here from Latin America, which has been falling in
recent years, than by the perceived threat to an established racial and
political order.233 This seems to be especially true in the immigrantreceiving cities in traditionally “red states.” It is no surprise then that some
of the most aggressive state anti-sanctuary eforts are centered in states
like Texas and Florida, with large immigrant-receiving and immigrantintegrative cities.
Perhaps most importantly, regardless of whether local politics is
based on uniquely local or personal considerations, it is almost certain to
be more accessible than either state or federal decisionmaking. In addition
229. See Monica Davey, He’s a Local Pillar in a Trump Town. Now He Could Be
Deported., N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/
immigration-trump-illinois-juan-pacheco.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
230. See Marwa Eltagouri, Conservative Indiana Town Rallies Around Immigrant
Facing Deportation, Chi. Trib. (May 17, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
immigration/ct-immigration-elkhart-indiana-trump-met-20170517-story.html (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review).
231. See Jorge Rivas, This Ohio Town Voted for Trump. Now They’re Fighting to Save a
Mexican Man from Deportation, Splinter News (June 21, 2017), https://splinternews.com/
this-ohio-town-voted-for-trump-now-theyre-fighting-to-1793857676 [https://perma.cc/GQ6N-7A8Y].
232. See Rodríguez, supra note 19, at 607 (naming in-state tuition as one issue in
which some traditionally red states have extended beneﬁts to illegal immigrants on
fairness grounds).
233. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, supra note 202, at 92–118 (using qualitative
empirical evidence to show that restrictionist local policies are fueled in part by white
ethnic nationalism).
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to providing a vehicle for immigrant integration and mobilization, local
institutional debates on whether and how to enact sanctuary policies are
part of a larger national conversation. While federal enforcement
policies have efectively made national enforcement decisions into local
concerns, the converse is also true. Local sanctuary policies are one
vehicle—an especially effective one—that local constituencies can use to
enter the national conversation over the proper level of immigration
enforcement speciﬁcally and the legitimacy of federal immigration
policies more generally. In other words, as the national immigration
enforcement regime becomes inextricably local, local preferences
inexorably calibrate national policymaking.
If local governments are an important platform for immigrants to
become a part of America’s political community and for all community
members to engage in debates over immigration policy, then immigrant
advocates and scholars should be highly concerned about the powers of
local governments. They should be invested not just because local power
is an important part of defending local sanctuary policies against the
anti-sanctuary eforts but also because the scope of local power is
important in determining the extent to which community attitudes on
immigration and immigrants are meaningful in our national discourse.
B.

The Perils of Immigration Localism

Undoubtedly, emphasizing local discretion is not without risks for
immigrant advocates. Here, we discuss two obvious responses to our
proposal that are likely to make immigrant advocates wary of this legal
and theoretical shift: (1) Local discretion might lead to the proliferation
of anti-sanctuary cities; and (2) a legal strategy bolstering local discretion
will weaken powerful state-level sanctuary protections.
1. Empowering Restrictionist Localities? — Thus far, this Essay has been
organized around the dynamic of state hostility to local sanctuary laws.
Accordingly, our focus on localist possibilities has underscored the need
to maintain discretion at the local level so that cities and counties can
retain the authority to resist conscription into federal enforcement
programs. But there is no guarantee that localism will always result in
immigrant-friendly or integrationist policies. Neither state-level preemption
nor local authority inherently tracks political ideologies or partisan
preferences. Thus, any structural power allocation or strong focus on
localism risks inviting dozens of enforcement-minded jurisdictions to
exercise their local discretion in a manner that recreates and ampliﬁes
the federal government’s enforcement regime.
Indeed, the entrepreneurial and political forces that have successfully
produced and proliferated state anti-sanctuary laws can and are being
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directed at the local level.234 As Professor Richard Schragger points out,
local policy ﬁghts have increasingly been waged by national policy
groups.235 And, as media reports suggest, policy entrepreneurs have
already found opportunities for pushing their vision at the local level.236
Indeed, local restrictionism even extends into “blue” states like
California, where the overall policy climate at the state level is
integrationist, with a suite of state laws seeking to mitigate federal
enforcement eforts. In that overwhelmingly immigrant-friendly state
environment, cities like Los Alamitos, Huntington Beach, and Santa
Clarita, along with counties like Orange County, have voiced their
displeasure with state sanctuary laws and announced their willingness to
bolster federal enforcement eforts.237

234. Texas S.B. 4, for example, is similar to proposals in Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina,
Florida, and other places with Republican-led state governments. See Kelly Cohen, State
Lawmakers Move to Penalize ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ Wash. Examiner (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/state-lawmakers-move-to-penalize-sanctuary-cities
[https://perma.cc/C9XU-2AWG]. Moreover, this copycat legislation in several “red” states
is not mere happenstance; rather it is strategized proliferation. See id. State lawmakers in
Colorado actually initiated the recent state anti-sanctuary trend. See Joey Bunch, Colorado
Springs Lawmaker’s Anti-Sanctuary City Bill Copied in Other States, Gazette (Colo.
Springs) (Feb. 6, 2017), https://gazette.com/politics/colorado-springs-lawmaker-s-anti-sanctuarycity-bill-copied-in/article_a86e1c04-e773-5084-b86a-a4ef541249fb.html [https://perma.cc/
7NHN-2R28]. In early 2017, Colorado state Republican Representative David Williams
introduced the Colorado Politician Accountability Act, H.B. 17-1134, which would have
created criminal and civil liability for local ofcials who implemented sanctuary-type
policies. See Jesse Paul, Immigration Debate Flares Up in Colorado as Lawmakers Weigh Bill
Targeting Sanctuary Cities, Denver Post (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/2017/
02/22/immigration-colorado-sanctuary-cities/ [https://perma.cc/Z4GY-B25U]. Even as
his proposal failed, state lawmakers in Ohio, Maine, and Alaska all introduced bills that
were based on Williams’s efort. See Bunch, supra.
235. See Schragger, supra note 95, at 1226 (“That the city has become a highly salient
site for national battles over everything from fracking to LGBT rights to plastic bags is
obvious from the long list of preemptive state legislation . . . .”).
236. See id. at 1227 (using ALEC as an example of a national policy group that has
inﬂuenced local policy ﬁghts by pushing a deregulatory agenda); see also Cindy Carcamo,
Orange County May Take Stand Against State’s ‘Sanctuary’ Laws, L.A. Times (Mar. 27, 2018),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-anti-sanctuary-movement-in-oc-20180327-story.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that the Federation of Americans for
Immigration Reform (FAIR), a national anti-immigration organization, had been
“searching for California Cities and Counties” that were interested in ﬁling briefs against
California’s state sanctuary law, S.B. 54); Jazmine Ulloa, Sanctuary State Fight at Local
Level May Be More Orchestrated than Organic, L.A. Times (May 2, 2018), http://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-gop-opposition-sanctuary-state-law-20180502-story.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting on the eforts by FAIR to combat
California’s sanctuary law at the local level).
237. See, e.g., Nina Agrawal, Santa Clarita Opposes California’s ‘Sanctuary’ Law, the
First City in L.A. County to Do So, L.A. Times (May 9, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clarita-sanctuary-20180508-story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting on the opposition to California’s sanctuary law, S.B. 54, across
various parts of California and the concomitant legal measures taken).
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The use of local policies to aid, rather than oppose, federal
enforcement eforts is not new. Between 2005 and 2012, several states and
localities passed varied anti-immigrant laws that created new penalties
based on immigration status.238 It was with these restrictionist examples
in mind that immigration scholars and advocates invoked the civil rights–
era perception of local policymakers as uninformed, parochial, and
prone to racist sentiments. These ideas fed into legal arguments against
those local policies, which were almost uniformly struck down by federal
courts, based on the preemption principles articulated by the Supreme
Court in Arizona v. United States.239 In comparison, however, the current
anti-sanctuary localism arguably seeks a more modest end, or at least one
more within the traditional boundaries of local control, cleverly crafted
in ways expressly contemplated and permitted by federal statute.240
Because they might be better insulated from legal attack, contemporary
local anti-sanctuary laws are ripe for proliferation by policy
entrepreneurs and national organizations.
Although it is possible that localism might encourage and empower
an anti-sanctuary trend, that worry need not mean turning away from a
localist strategy. First, it may be that localism will empower exclusionary
and restrictionist cities, but one may yet believe that the beneﬁts of
localism will outweigh its potential to be parochial.241 Indeed, any
structural doctrine might be used by interested political forces to achieve
anti-immigrant ends. But that concern is no diferent for localism than it
is for favoring the central government or a state-centered federalism.
Much will always depend on who maintains political control over those
jurisdictions. Given this Essay’s arguments about localized concerns with
immigration enforcement and the need for civic participation and
debate on those issues, a strong case can be made for lodging some

238. In the prior era of state and local restrictionism, from 2005 through 2012, several
cities—including Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Fremont, Nebraska; Valley Park, Missouri;
Farmer’s Branch, Texas; and Escondido, California—attempted versions and variations of
immigration enforcement laws that included rental ordinances, work-solicitation bans,
language policies, and other forms of local resistance to the presence of undocumented and
other noncitizens. See, e.g., Muzafar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Hazleton Immigration
Ordinance that Began with a Bang Goes Out with a Whimper, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Mar.
28, 2014), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hazleton-immigration-ordinance-beganbang-goes-out-whimper [https://perma.cc/78WJ-MUKX] (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
refusal to review two federal appellate court decisions that struck down controversial local
immigration enforcement ordinances in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch,
Texas).
239. 567 U.S. 387, 400–15 (2012) (applying preemption principles to each of the four
challenged provisions of the Arizona immigration law at issue).
240. See supra section I.C (discussing the legal distinction between federal and state
anti-sanctuary strategies).
241. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 979–80 (describing this
view as “ecumenical” localism).
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measure of discretion at the local level instead of elsewhere, despite the
possibility of restrictionist outcomes.242
Immigration enforcement might be a regulatory area that provides a
hopeful outcome for immigrant advocates willing to live with the varied
policy outcomes of an uncalibrated localist stance. Perhaps because of
the visceral and immediate impact of local immigration policies, local
enforcement policies tend to be more ﬂuid and dynamic than those
same policies at the state and national level. Local democracies do not
always produce integrationist policies; however, local politics and policies
also quickly change, either because of changing sentiment or changing
demographics.
Hazleton’s anti-immigrant ordinance may be the poster child for the
parochial possibilities of local government involvement in immigration.
But it is also an example of how quickly things can change.243 Lou
Barletta, the former mayor of Hazleton and the lead proponent behind
its anti-immigrant ordinance, departed for Congress in 2011—leaving his
city with the cost of litigation and the settlement agreement after the
ordinance was struck down by courts. In the meantime, however,
Hazleton has become close to a majority-Latino city, and the community
dynamics have evolved to become more tolerant and welcoming.244 A
similar dynamic unfolded in Farmers Branch, Texas, where the
population is now forty-ﬁve percent Latino.245 The Latino community’s
political mobilization following the enactment of the city’s antiimmigrant ordinance and its ensuing litigation has reshaped not only the
face but also the tone of local politics.246 Then there is Riverside, New
Jersey—the township that nobody remembers. Though it was one of the
ﬁrst communities to enact an anti-immigrant ordinance in 2006, it was
also among the ﬁrst to repeal such an ordinance—a little more than a
year after its enactment—when the community concluded that the
ordinance did more to hurt the community than it did to help.247

242. See supra section III.A.2.
243. See Michael Matza, 10 Years After Immigration Dispute, Hazleton Is a Diferent
Place, Inquirer (Phila.) (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160403_10_years_
after_immigration_disputes__Hazleton_is_a_different_place.html [https://perma.cc/GF5FXQHP] (explaining the evolution of public sentiment in Hazleton, following the invalidation
of its anti-immigrant city ordinance).
244. See id.
245. Elvia Limon, Farmers Branch Still Trying to Move Forward from Shadow of
Controversial Rental Ordinance, Dall. Morning News (Aug. 2016), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/farmers-branch/2016/08/26/farmers-branch-still-trying-move-forward-shadowcontroversial-rentalordinance [https://perma.cc/Y396-WJCU].
246. See id. (reporting on the lingering efects of the battle over Farmers Branch’s
anti-immigration ordinance and how local politics have changed since).
247. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 26, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/nyregion/26riverside.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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Second, if one is not willing to let local-government chips fall where
they may, one might still embrace immigration localism if it can be
calibrated to discourage or constrain restrictionist outcomes. On this
view, antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles found in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might be
deployed to strike down the most egregious forms of local exclusion and
restrictionism while preserving local sanctuary policies. To be sure, equal
protection arguments have not been as successful in challenging local
enforcement-minded policies against noncitizens.248 Even though courts
sometimes employ a higher standard of review—strict scrutiny—when
examining claims of state or local government discrimination against
some noncitizens,249 state and local discrimination against undocumented
immigrants does not receive that highest level of scrutiny.250 Moreover,
litigants would face an uphill battle trying to convince a court that local
enforcement laws discriminate on racial, ethnic, or national origin
grounds. In challenging Arizona’s S.B. 1070, for example, the federal
government was forced to concede in oral argument that it was not
making a claim of racial discrimination.251 Indeed, the Court ultimately
allowed S.B. 1070’s anti-sanctuary provision to go into efect.252
Nevertheless, there is some hope that a more fully developed constitutional jurisprudence regarding discrimination based on immigration
status might be up to the task of diferentiating between sanctuary and
anti-sanctuary policies.253 Although the Supreme Court declined to ﬁnd

248. See Sofía D. Martos, Coded Codes: Discriminatory Intent, Modern Political
Mobilization, and Local Immigration Ordinances, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2099, 2108, 2113 (2010)
(explaining the difculties of challenging immigration-related quality of life ordinances
on equal protection grounds); Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At
the Intersection of Property, Race and Citizenship, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 979, 994 (2010)
(explaining how the Supreme Court, in deciding challenges to local property laws that
restricted the property rights of noncitizens, ignored equal protection arguments).
249. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[T]he Court’s decisions
have established that classiﬁcations based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)).
250. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24, 230 (1982) (striking down a state law
denying free public education to undocumented children because the state failed to show
that the law “futher[ed] some substantial state interest,” but declining to exercise strict
scrutiny review). Discrimination by the federal government against noncitizens, by
contrast, receives the Court’s very deferential rational basis review. See Mathews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81–84 (1976).
251. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387
(2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1425227.
252. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 414 –15.
253. As the Supreme Court recognized in Graham v. Richardson, immigrants “as a class
are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority.’” 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); see also Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948) (applying equal protection principles to
noncitizens); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(arguing that a state law that “prohibit[ed] all aliens ineligible for American citizenship
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that S.B. 1070’s section 2(B), the anti-sanctuary provision mandating that
local ofcers inquire about immigration status upon a reasonable
suspicion a suspect was in the country illegally, was preempted, the Court
left open the possibility that the law may be challenged based on
evidence of discriminatory application.254 And, eventually, after further
litigation by advocacy groups,255 the Attorney General of Arizona settled,
agreeing to substantially limit the enforcement of section 2(B) of S.B.
1070.256
In addition, as Professor Hiroshi Motomura has argued, courts might
obliquely recognize evidence of racial and national origin discrimination
in assessing local legislation.257 In Lozano v. Hazleton, for instance,
plaintifs challenged a local ordinance that required landlords to inquire
about the immigration status of potential tenants.258 Although the district
court did not rule for plaintifs on their equal protection claim, it struck
down the law on preemption grounds.259 According to Motomura, the
evidence presented about discrimination may have subtly motivated the
court’s decisionmaking.260 Moreover, relevant to the discussion of localism,
advocates may look to state constitutional and statutory
antidiscrimination protections to bolster claims against local antisanctuary legislation.261

from acquiring, owning, occupying, enjoying, leasing or transferring agricultural land”
violated equal protection principles and thus “deserve[d] constitutional condemnation”).
254. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415 (noting that the Court’s opinion “does not
foreclose . . . constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes
into efect”).
255. See Press Release, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Arizona Attorney General Issues
Opinion Establishing Constitutional Standards for Enforcement of Key SB 1070
Provisions, Ending Lawsuit (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/2016/09/15/arizonaattorney-general-issues-opinion-establishing-constitutional-standards-enforcement-key-sb1070-provisions-ending-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/KAT2-QCBQ].
256. See Joint Case Disposition at 1, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV-10-01061-PHXSRB (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/1297Joint-Case-Disposition.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9TC-MTLG]; Joint Case Disposition, exh.
A at 2–5, Valle del Sol, No. CV-10-01061-PHX-SRB, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/1297-1-Exhibit-A-Proposed-Attorney-General-Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N4GV-N3NM] (deﬁning and limiting police ofcer conduct in relation to S.B. 1070
section 2(B)).
257. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration
Outside the Law, 59 Duke L.J. 1723, 1728–29 (2010) [hereinafter Motomura, The Rights
of Others] (summarizing the ways in which unauthorized migrants may indirectly assert
their rights to equal protection when challenging government decisions).
258. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484–85 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
259. Id. at 533, 542.
260. See Motomura, The Rights of Others, supra note 257, at 1742–46 (noting the
substantial evidence on race and ethnicity and its potential link to the Lozano court’s
preemption analysis).
261. See Davidson, Dilemma of Localism, supra note 34, at 964–74 (outlining examples of
different states asserting authority to constrain local laws in a variety of policy areas).
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Ultimately, antidiscrimination and equality norms may not currently
provide an express and consistently reliable legal wedge to separate local
sanctuary policies from anti-sanctuary ones. But that does not mean that
advocates should give up seeking to normatively inﬂect structural power
doctrines.262 Indeed, we see this as opportunity to develop new doctrinal
approaches to equal protection in the immigration context.263
2. Undermining State Sanctuary. — A second and related concern is
that a localist strategy will bolster the legal case for local resistance to
state-level sanctuary laws. This dynamic is currently playing out in litigation
against California’s suite of sanctuary laws, including the California Values
Act S.B. 54, sometimes referred to as the “state sanctuary law.”264 In
March 2018, the Trump Administration ﬁled a complaint against the
State of California regarding its state sanctuary laws.265 Seeking injunctive
relief enjoining the enforcement of these laws, the complaint speciﬁcally
targets Assembly Bill 450 (A.B. 450),266 Assembly Bill 103 (A.B. 103),267
and Senate Bill 54 (S.B. 54).268 These laws, according to the United
262. See id. at 984 (“While there is no simple way to resolve the dilemma [of
localism], normative considerations undergirding the vertical allocation of power in the
states should be more directly confronted . . . .”).
263. For instance, one might examine ways that evidence of animus against
unauthorized immigrants may be used to demonstrate subordination of a particular group
in violation of equal protection principles under the “animus doctrine.” See, e.g., Alina
Das, Inclusive Immigrant Justice: Racial Animus and the Origins of Crime-Based
Deportation, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 171, 176 (2018). Or one may explore how even the
rational basis approach may be used to strike down current discriminatory treatment of
immigrants. See Katie Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1317, 1365-66 (2018) (arguing for the underappreciated potential role of rational basis to
advance social movement goals).
264. S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
265. California Complaint, supra note 24, at 2–3.
266. A.B. 450, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). A.B. 450 prohibits private
employers from voluntarily cooperating with federal ofcials who seek information
relevant to immigration enforcement in places of employment. Id. § 1. Employers may not
consent to an immigration agent to enter nonpublic areas of the workplace unless the
agent provides a warrant. Id. § 2. The United States argues that this provision interferes
with the enforcement of the INA and Immigration Reform and Control Act’s prohibition
on working without authorization. California Complaint, supra note 24, at 7–9.
267. A.B. 103, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). AB 103 creates an inspectionand-review process requiring the California Attorney General to investigate enforcement
eforts of federal agents. Id. § 12. It permits an inspection of facilities and an examination
of the due process provided to civil immigration detainees. Id. It allows access to detainees,
ofcials, personnel, and records. Id. The United States argues this is an “improper,
significant intrusion into federal enforcement of the immigration laws” and that California
lacks any lawful interest in such investigatory eforts. California Complaint, supra note 24,
at 10, 12–13.
268. Cal. S.B. 54. S.B. 54 limits the ability of state and local law enforcement ofcers to
provide federal agents with information about the individuals in custody and subject to
federal immigration custody or to transfer these individuals to federal immigration custody.
Id. § 3. The provisions allow release of an individual or her information only if the United
States provides a judicial warrant. Id. § 2. The United States characterized this law as
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States, are preempted by federal law and impermissibly discriminate
against the United States.269 In other words, by making it difficult for federal
immigration officers to enforce federal immigration law, California is
obstructing laws that “Congress has enacted . . . to take actions entrusted to
it by the [U.S.] Constitution.”270
Localities in California allied with the federal government’s
enforcement vision will undoubtedly rely on the same forms of municipal
empowerment that could beneﬁt sanctuary cities and counties in antisanctuary states like Texas. Despite the fact that California is home to the
largest number of immigrants in the nation271 and has passed the most
integrative set of laws at the state level, the negative sentiment against the
state’s protection of immigrants endures in select cities and counties.
Two prominent California counties, San Diego County272 and Orange
County,273 have backed President Trump’s challenge to the State’s
sanctuary laws. Similarly, the cities of Yorba Linda, Hesperia, Escondido,
Aliso Viejo, Mission Viejo, Fountain Valley, and Barstow have ﬁled briefs
in support of the federal government.274 In this regard, these localities
are following the oft-used tactic of aligning themselves with the federal
government in raising preemption challenges against their state—
mirroring what localities did in contesting California’s Proposition 187 in
1994 and Arizona’s S.B. 1070 in 2010.275 Thus far, however, the federal
government challenge has not had much success. Ruling on the federal
government’s motion for preliminary injunction, a California district
court has mostly rejected the federal government’s argument that the
creating “difcult and dangerous eforts to re-arrest aliens who were previously in state
custody, endangering immigration officers, the alien at issue, and others.” California
Complaint, supra note 24, at 2–3, 16.
269. See California Complaint, supra note 24, at 2.
270. Id. at 3.
271. Hans Johnson & Sergio Sanchez, Just the Facts: Immigrants in California, Pub.
Pol’y Inst. of Cal. (May 2018), http://www.ppic.org/publication/immigrants-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/V8F8-HPX6]. In 2016, the U.S. Census Bureau found that 27% of
California’s population are foreign-born persons. QuickFacts: California, U.S. Census Bureau,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/CA/POP645216#viewtop [https://perma.cc/
JZ5E-AU4K] (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
272. Jennifer McEntee, San Diego County Backs Trump Challenge to California ‘Sanctuary’
Law, Reuters (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-california/
san-diego-county-backs-trump-challenge-to-california-sanctuary-law-idUSKBN1HO2XE [https://
perma.cc/BY6B-GAT2].
273. Jef Daniels, Trump Throws His Support Behind Orange County in Its War
Against the California Sanctuary Law, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/28/trump-throws-support-behind-orange-county-in-fight-against-california-sanctuarylaw.html [https://perma.cc/97KW-7GUP].
274. Municipalities & Elected Ofcials Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief in
Support of Plaintif’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, United States v. California, 314 F.
Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN); Municipalities & Elected
Officials Amici Curiae Brief, California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (No. 2:18-CV-00490-JAM-KJN).
275. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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laws were preempted or violated the intergovernmental immunities
doctrine.276
Separately, however, the City of Huntington Beach ﬁled a state
constitutional challenge against S.B. 54 in state court.277 What makes this
challenge interesting is that Huntington Beach’s claim most directly
invokes the kind of localism arguments suggested in this Essay in the
anti-sanctuary context. California is a home-rule state. In fact, it stands
apart from other home-rule states in that it is one of the few that grants
localities immunity from state legislative preemption on matters of
municipal affairs (synonymous with local affairs).278 Accordingly,
Huntington Beach argues that home rule provides it the authority to
control its municipal affairs, direct its resources, and contract directly with
the federal government. In addition, it claims that S.B. 54 impermissibly
meddles with that authority when it directs what localities can and cannot
do with their personnel, facilities, or funds.279 In short, Huntington
Beach is raising a structural-integrity argument in its efort to free itself
from state preemption, albeit in favor of immigration enforcement. As
such, it seems clear that any argument we advance in favor of local
discretion for cities, like El Cenizo, seeking to disentangle themselves
from state-mandated cooperation with federal authorities will redound to
the beneﬁt of cities like Huntington Beach in their attempt to buck
276. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 1086 (granting in part and denying in part a
preliminary injunction). The court declined to preliminarily enjoin all the challenged
provisions of S.B. 54 and A.B. 103, ﬁnding neither ﬁeld nor obstacle preemption and
ruling that the intergovernmental immunities doctrine was not violated. See id. at 1093,
1104, 1110. With regard to A.B. 450, the court declined to enjoin the provision requiring
employers to provide notice to their employees of workplace audits by immigration
authorities; however, the court found the provision that prohibited employers from
consenting to searches of their workplaces to likely violate the intergovernmental
immunities doctrine and therefore preliminarily enjoined that section. See id. at 1096–97.
277. See Kartikay Mehrotra, Huntington Beach Sues California over Immigration
Policy, Bloomberg (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0404/surf-city-usa-lawyers-up-to-take-on-california-over-immigrants (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
278. See Cal. Const. art. XI, § 5(a).
279. See, e.g., Mehrotra, supra note 277 (quoting a Huntington City attorney stating
that “[t]he state can’t tell us what we can and cannot spend our money on” and asserting
that “[t]he way that law is drafted is the deﬁnition of constitutional overreach in
California” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Priscella Vega, State Not Backing Down
After Huntington Beach Wins in Court Challenge to ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Law, L.A.
Times (Sept. 28, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-me-hbsb54-folo-20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/7KXY-75FV] (describing the city’s
argument that “the law violates its local control as a charter city”). A superior court in
California has since ruled in Huntington Beach’s favor, but the state is appealing the
decision. See Order for Issuance of Peremptory Writ of Mandate, City of Huntington
Beach v. State of California, 30-2018-00984280-CU-WM-CJC (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2018);
Priscella Vega, State Files Notice of Appeal Against O.C. Judge’s Ruling Exempting
Huntington Beach from ‘Sanctuary’ Law, L.A. Times (Nov. 10, 2018), https://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-huntington-beach-sanctuary-20181110-story.html [https://
perma.cc/K6TG-6CS2].
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state-mandated limitations on their ability to participate in federal
enforcement efforts.
For sanctuary advocates, Huntington Beach’s lawsuit illustrates the
double-edged sword in turning to localism and advancing local-autonomy
claims. On the one hand, if California state courts find that immigration
enforcement is not a municipal afair, then S.B. 54 preempts local
policies and mandates sanctuary throughout the entire state. But such a
ﬁnding will likely hamper eforts by localities in other states to raise
structural-integrity or other localism claims based on their home-rule
powers over local or municipal afairs. Indeed, if participation in federal
immigration enforcement is not a municipal afair at all, then home-rule
localities may be denied even the basic authority to enact sanctuary
policies altogether, even in the absence of state anti-sanctuary.
On the other hand, a victory for Huntington Beach on the municipal
afairs question may strengthen similar claims by localities in other states,
either on the basis of home-rule immunity or other structural
protections. But it might also undermine state sanctuary eforts in places
like Illinois, where the state can preempt on matters of local government
afairs only if it explicitly states its intent to override home-rule authority,
which Illinois’s sanctuary law does not do.280 Of course, a California
ruling does not bind other state courts. Moreover, home rule in
California is particularly strong. But given the similar language concerning
“local” and “municipal afairs,” it is likely that any interpretation of its
scope in the context of home rule will be inﬂuential elsewhere.
Now, it may be possible to argue that localism arguments in support
of local sanctuary policies do not stand on the same footing as local antisanctuary policies. After all, if the foundation of the localism argument
that Huntington Beach is raising is premised on a city’s power over its
own municipal afairs, it would appear that policies that separate
localities from the federal immigration enforcement are more squarely
within that sphere than is a policy that seeks to expand local entanglement
with federal law enforcement. After all, a decade earlier, the central
debate with respect to cities in immigration enforcement was whether
they could participate at all, given the federal government’s plenary power
over immigration. It is only recently that the question has turned to
whether they can refuse to participate.
280. See Ill. Const. art. VII, § 6. It is worth noting that if Illinois did explicitly express
its intent to preempt home rule authority, that would also mean that Chicago’s
“Welcoming Cities” ordinance would be preempted. While providing for sanctuary
generally, Chicago’s policy allows cooperation with federal authorities in cases that
Illinois’s sanctuary law does not. Compare 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/15 (West 2019)
(prohibiting enforcement of federal civil immigration laws), with Chi., Ill., Mun. Code of
Chi. ch. 2-173-042 (2018) (allowing cooperation with federal immigration authorities in
certain situations). This still raises the question of whether localities or states are in a
better position to decide when and the degree to which local law enforcement should
involve themselves in immigration enforcement activities.
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But even assuming that some forms of state sanctuary legislation
might be compromised by strengthening the hand of localities, it is not
clear how detrimental this would be to the project of mitigating the
federal hyperenforcement regime. Absent a statewide standard, the
largest and most populous localities in the state—Los Angeles County,
Santa Clara County, and San Francisco—still maintain local sanctuary
policies that are just as, if not more, stringent than the statewide rule.
Meanwhile, localities that oppose the S.B. 54 standards have already
found ways to undermine key aspects of the law’s attempt to shield
noncitizens from federal enforcement.281 Orange County and Contra
Costa County, for example, began to publicize release dates for inmates
in their custody on their website;282 by making that information public,
they were able to circumvent S.B. 54’s prohibition on communicating
certain information with federal immigration authorities.
Again, this is not to downplay how much state sanctuary laws like
those in California are important landmarks with substantive protections
for noncitizens. Undoubtedly, California’s S.B. 54 and its suite of other
integrationist measures are remarkable legislative achievements that
provide more statewide protection for noncitizens than any other
jurisdiction.283 And other states may follow suit. But given that the largest,
most immigrant-heavy jurisdictions across the country are almost
uniformly sanctuary jurisdictions, it is not clear that a weakened state
ability to enact sanctuary legislation will necessarily be a worse outcome
than weakening the ability of counties, sherifs’ departments, police
departments, and cities to enact integrationist policies.
In the end, though, we acknowledge the difculty that cases like the
one involving Huntington Beach raise for immigration advocates. Like
federalism, localism on its own has no “political valence.”284 In theory, at
least, it may be used to support progressive or conservative policies—
281. See Jerome Ma & Nicholas Pavlovic, California Divided: The Restrictions and
Vulnerabilities in Implementing SB 54, 26 Asian Am. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript
at 37–40) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing ways in which diferent
localities have implemented the state law).
282. Id. (manuscript at 31); see also Roxana Kopetman, In Response to California
Sanctuary Law, Orange County Sherif Makes Public Inmates’ Release Dates, Orange
County Reg. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/03/26/in-response-tocalifornia-sanctuary-law-orange-county-sherif-makes-public-inmates-release-dates/ [https://
perma.cc/78GL-JF82].
283. See, e.g., S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package:
Immigrant Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, Pol’y Matters, Spring
2015, at 1, 1–2 (arguing that the “California package” of integration laws protecting
unauthorized immigrants “goes well beyond any beneﬁts imagined in federal proposals on
immigration reform”); Karthick Ramakrishnan, Opinion, Look to California’s Model, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/09/03/is-immigrationreally-a-problem-in-the-us/look-to-californias-model (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing beneﬁts given to undocumented immigrants in California).
284. Heather K. Gerken, A User’s Guide to Progressive Federalism, 45 Hofstra L. Rev.
1087, 1087 (2017).
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sanctuary and anti-sanctuary alike. But that also means that there is no
neutral position; eschewing localism or local-autonomy arguments has
just as much of an efect on substantive policies like sanctuary and antisanctuary as embracing them.
On balance, given the degree to which sanctuary historically has been,
and continues to be, spearheaded by local governments, greater local
autonomy will promote rather than impede eforts to develop a more
efective and humane immigration enforcement system. Even putting
substantive policy outcomes aside, it may be that normative claims about
localism and the local political process, some of which are outlined in
this Essay, make greater local autonomy worthwhile. One thing is clear,
though: It is no longer possible to ignore localism in how we think about
immigration and immigration enforcement.
CONCLUSION
The battlegrounds for the nationwide ﬁght over sanctuary cities are
shifting. As federal eforts to coerce participation in immigration
enforcement eforts have ﬂoundered, state legislatures have taken up the
call. The state anti-sanctuary laws that have been proposed or passed
threaten to quash local dissent on immigration enforcement policy more
efectively than their federal counterparts. In turn, those interested in
preserving local discretion to resist complicity and conscription into the
federal immigration enforcement scheme must also embrace new legal
and theoretical frameworks.
This Essay suggests that immigration advocates and commentators will
benefit from embracing municipal authority in immigration enforcement
law. The emerging anti-sanctuary trend, typified by punitive and draconian
provisions, provides a ripe opportunity to test the limits of state control
over local discretion. More broadly, recognizing municipal control over
sanctuary policies is a recognition of the local nature of national
immigration policies and, simultaneously, a recognition of the national
implications of local policymaking. A localist lens broadens our
understanding of where and how critical immigration enforcement
governance decisions are made and provides the legal and theoretical
space to preserve that control.
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